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ABSTRACT  
There is increasing evidence that anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions are the 
major cause for global warming. A changing external environment and societal 
pressure is driving companies to respond to climate change and to limit further 
contribution where possible. Despite carbon emissions still being largely unregulated 
and carbon disclosure not being mandatory, many companies in South Africa have 
voluntarily decided to reduce emissions and make disclosures to the Carbon 
Disclosure Project (CDP). Institutional, socio-political and economic voluntary 
disclosure theories all indicate that there is a pressure for companies to monitor their 
climate mitigation, evaluate the costs of disclosing and manage stakeholders’ 
pressures by producing voluntary climate change disclosure. The CDP scores the 
disclosure made by each company as a measure of the company’s progress towards 
environmental stewardship. The highest CDP score indicates that a company has 
leadership in its efforts to environmental stewardship and so addressed stakeholders’ 
concerns. This study aims to determine which factors, either company specific or 
individual company responses within the CDP questionnaire, influence a high CDP 
climate change score for South African companies. The top 100 South African 
companies were selected using a full Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) listing as 
at 31 March 2017 and the climate change programme score and individual company 
responses to the climate change questionnaire were obtained from the CDP for the 
five-year period from 2013 to 2017. A random effect model was used to examine the 
determinants of voluntary disclosure of carbon information. The results indicate that 
while CDP scores have improved post the signing of the Paris Agreement in December 
2015, providing incentives for managing climate change has also led to improvements 
in the CDP score which results in improved climate change disclosure. Furthermore, 
the longer the company assesses climate change risks and opportunities into the 
future, the better its CDP score. This research contributes a more thorough 
understanding of disclosure theories, as established from these results.  In terms of 
institutional theories, institutional investors should call for incentives to motivate for 
climate change management because companies might then be more likely to receive 
a better CDP score. In terms of socio-political theories, this study’s findings indicate 
that managers should be made aware that the further into the future they consider 
climate change risk management the better because this practice will result in the 
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company obtaining an improved CDP score, while simultaneously managing 
stakeholders’ perceptions of the company. Additionally, this study contributes by 
making recommendations for companies and policy makers.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Climate change is referred to as the “greatest challenge of our time” (DEA, 2016, p. 
4). Climate scientists have indicated that anthropogenic1 greenhouse gas emissions 
(GHG) are the biggest contributor to climate change (Cook et al., 2016; IPCC, 2014b). 
A changing external environment and societal pressure are driving companies to 
respond to climate change and limit further contribution where possible (Luo, Lan, & 
Tang, 2012). Despite carbon emissions still being largely unregulated and carbon 
disclosure not being mandatory, many companies in South Africa have voluntarily 
decided to reduce emissions and make disclosures to the Carbon Disclosure Project 
(CDP) (NBI, 2016). The CDP measures a company’s progress towards environmental 
stewardship and awards the company a score (CDP, 2016b). A company that has the 
highest score indicates to stakeholders that the company has a leadership progress 
to environmental stewardship. Understanding what drives good disclosure of climate 
change might result in improved disclosure (Qian & Schaltegger, 2017), and thus 
contribute to tackling the “greatest challenge of our time”  (DEA, 2016, p. 4). This claim 
motivates for this study to investigate what factors influence a South African company 
to achieve a high CDP score.  
The International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has stated that there has been 
human influence on the climate system which, in turn, has impacted humans and 
animals (IPCC, 2014b). The IPPC is the global authority on climate science and is 
responsible for assessing the direct impact of climate change on temperature, rainfall 
and the resultant impact on humans, plants, animals and how this impact is transmitted 
to world trade (IPCC, 2014b). The IPCC’s assessments on climate change have called 
for anthropogenic sources of greenhouse gases (GHG) to be limited. Thus, the 
changing climate has required intergovernmental co-ordination of mitigation strategies 
under the Kyoto Protocol and, more recently, in the Paris Agreement. Where both the 
Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement are international sub-treaties under the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) that call for the 
reduction of GHGs (Gupta & Mason, 2016).  
 
1 Anthropogenic’ is a term which means caused by human activity (IPCC, 2014a).  
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In South Africa climate change is notable in temperature changes, rainfall variations 
and rising sea levels (National Planning Commission, 2011). As such the South 
African Department of Environment Affairs (DEA) acceded to the Kyoto Protocol (DEA, 
2004; Eskom, 2011) and signed the Paris Agreement declaring its commitment to 
become a low carbon economy (UNFCCC, 2017). South Africa’s involvement in the 
Paris Agreement has also called for the involvement of companies in the private sector 
(DEA, 2017). Furthermore, the South African DEA stated that it will evaluate the 
private sector’s transition to a lower carbon economy, based on their participation and 
activities disclosed in their responses to the CDP (DEA, 2017).  
Climate change could result in a direct change in a company’s external environment. 
This alteration, therefore, will impact on its ability to acquire, retain and grow the six 
capitals2 that is required to create value; and, therefore, result in a cost to the company 
(Promethium Carbon & The Climate Disclosure Standards Board, 2013; Yow, M 
Rubin, 2017). Additionally, societal pressure has driven companies to respond to 
climate change and to limit further contribution to climate change (Less & Kauffmann, 
2009; Okereke, Wittneben & Bowen, 2012). 
Voluntary climate change disclosure is used by companies to acknowledge the gravity 
of the climate issue and to support the conclusions reached by the IPPC and Kyoto 
Protocol (Ihlen, 2009). As such many companies voluntarily disclose carbon 
information to appease stakeholders who want to see a response to climate change 
(Chow & Wong-Boren, 1987). Disclosure made to the CDP is an example of voluntary 
disclosure.  
The rationale for producing disclosure is explained by three voluntary disclosure 
frameworks, namely Institutional theories, Economic theories and Socio-political 
theories. Hahn, Reimsbach & Schiemann (2015) indicated that a large portion of prior 
literature did not use a theoretical foundation when developing their hypothesis and 
instead relied on prior empirical evidence. This study will attempt to clarify this claim 
by linking each variable to one of the three theoretical foundations. Furthermore, prior 
studies made use of the CDP for its final score only (Luo et al., 2012; Stanny & Ely, 
2008) but did not incorporate any of the qualitative questions from within the CDP 
 
2 Six capitals is defined as financial, human, social, relational, manufactured and intellectual capital by the 
International Integrated Reporting Council in the Integrated Reporting Framework (IIRC, 2013).  
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questionnaire. Thus, the research question for this study is: Which factors, either 
company specific or individual company responses, within the CDP questionnaire 
influence a high CDP climate change score for South African companies. 
A sample comprising one hundred South African companies was selected using a full 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) listing as at 31 March 2017. Additionally, the 
climate change programme score and individual company responses to the climate 
change questionnaire were obtained from the CDP. This study will be looking at the 
CDP scores over the full five-year period from 2013 to 2017. This study will use a 
panel data model to conduct the quantitative analysis of the impact of the variables. 
More specifically, the random effect model will be used to examine the determinants 
of voluntary disclosure of carbon information, thereby testing the said hypothesis.  
This study had three findings. Firstly, the Paris Agreement variable is positively 
statistically significant which suggests that South African companies are considering 
the seriousness of addressing the climate change issue post the signing of the Paris 
Agreement. Secondly, the Future Risk variable, which was also positively statistically 
significant, indicates that there is likely to be better environmental stewardship the 
further into the future the companies’ management considers climate change and 
because the longer-term view leads to better behaviour across a range of issues. 
Lastly, where companies provide incentives for the management of climate change 
issues, these companies are more likely to have a higher CDP score. 
Therefore, companies should consider the structure of incentives for managing 
climate change issues.  
This research contributes to literature by making recommendations for companies and 
policy makers. Additionally, a more thorough understanding of disclosure theories was 
established from these results. In terms of Socio-political theories, this study’s findings 
indicate that managers should be made aware that the further into the future they 
consider climate change risk management the better because this practice will result 
in the company obtaining an improved CDP score, while simultaneously enhancing 
stakeholders’ perceptions of the company. If a company wants to improve its CDP 
score, it should ensure that it is incentivising its staff to manage climate change. 
Policymakers in South Africa could draw attention to the research findings that a 
company’s CDP score improves if future risk is considered further into the future and 
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encourage companies to align their disclosure to the objectives of the Paris 
Agreement. Furthermore, this process could assist policy makers to get their policies 
implemented sooner.  
This study is not claiming to assess what drives good responses to climate change, 
only the assessment of company’s disclosure to the CDP on climate change. This 
limitation does not hinder the relevance of this research because disclosure of climate 
change to the CDP is indicative of companies acknowledging the importance of the 
climate change issue (Doran & Quinn, 2009) and companies detailing their risk 
exposure to climate change which previously has been lacking in practice (Doran & 
Quinn, 2009). 
This study will initially present a review of prior related literature. This review will 
include a discussion of what climate change is, its history and the applicability of 
climate change in South Africa. Subsequently, the reasons why companies need to 
consider climate change will be detailed together with an explanation of what voluntary 
disclosure is and how it relates to climate change. Then, the review will conclude by 
presenting studies that have considered the theoretical bases for voluntary climate 
change disclosure.  After this exposition, the method of analysis to be utilised in this 
study will be presented and the mode of testing discussed. The research question will 
be posed, following which the results of this study will be presented to answer the 
research question. Lastly, the researcher’s conclusions, based on the results, will be 
presented.  
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LITERATURE REVIEW3  
INTRODUCTION  
This study’s aim is to explore which factors, either company specific or individual 
company responses, within the CDP questionnaire, influence a high CDP climate 
change score. This study will focus its literature review on the relevance of voluntary 
climate change reporting both globally and in South Africa.  
This literature review begins by examining what climate change is, its history and the 
applicability of climate change in South Africa. Subsequently, why companies need to 
consider climate change will be detailed together with an examination of what 
voluntary disclosure is and how it relates to climate change.  The review will conclude 
by presenting studies that have considered the theoretical basis for voluntary climate 
change disclosure.   
CLIMATE CHANGE  
 
Climate change is referred to as the “greatest challenge of our time” (Department of 
Environmental Affairs, 2016, p. 4). The term ‘climate’ can be narrowly defined as the 
average variability of the weather over a period of time, ranging from months to 
thousands or millions of years (IPCC, 2014a, p. 119). The climate is generally 
underpinned by the natural phenomena: electromagnetic radiation. Electromagnetic 
radiation is transferred from sunlight and when the sunlight enters the atmosphere of 
the earth, streams of photons are transferred from the sun and this energy is absorbed 
by the earth, causing its temperature to increase (Dessler & Parson, 2010, p. 10). This 
flow of energy from the atmosphere was discovered by Joseph Fourier and has 
become known as the greenhouse effect (Dessler & Parson, 2010; Pierrehumbert & 
Archer, 2011). Interference with this natural phenomenon causes changes to the 
climate system.  
In the nineteenth century, Swedish chemist Svante Arrhenius and English physicist 
John Tyndall established that the Industrial Revolution was causing increased 
amounts of carbon dioxide, one of the greenhouse gases (GHGs), to be released into 
 
3 Extracts from this chapter have been compiled as a conference paper. These extracts have not been 
separately identified throughout the chapter.  
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the atmosphere (NASA, 1998; Stern, 2006). Svante predicted that as the consumption 
of fossil fuels increases so will the concentrations of carbon dioxide (NASA, 1998). 
The work of Svante, Tyndall and others led to the understanding of ‘global warming’. 
The term ‘global warming’ refers to the gradual increase of the Earth’s temperature 
from heightened GHG emissions, particularly carbon dioxide (IPCC, 2014a, p. 124).  
This increased presence of carbon dioxide is anthropogenic and could lead to 
ramifications such as increased global temperatures. 
Climate science contains many uncertainties (Oreskes, 2004) because it relies on 
models which make predictions which could lead to uncertainties in the timing, 
magnitude and regional patterns of climate change (IPCC, 1990). Ninety percent of 
publishing climate scientists agree that anthropogenic GHG emissions are the highest 
in history (Cook et al., 2016; IPCC, 2014b). The remainder of scientists question 
whether the GHG emissions are entirely anthropogenic (Cook et al., 2016; Dessler & 
Parson, 2010).  
The International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has stated that there has been 
human influence on the climate system which, in turn, has impacted humans and 
animals (IPCC, 2014b). From observations since the 1950s, global warming of the 
earth’s surface has caused the atmosphere and the ocean to warm, which 
subsequently leads to diminishing ice and rising sea levels (IPCC & WMO, 1990). In 
addition to this, there are altering precipitation patterns (IPCC, 2014b). Other evidence 
of climate change has been seen in the shift in the geographical ranges, seasonal 
activities and migration patterns of many terrestrial, freshwater and marine species 
(IPCC, 2014b).  
The above effects of climate change could be intensified by the continued emissions 
of carbon dioxide at present rates, which could commit global populations to 
heightened concentrations of GHGs for centuries (IPCC, 2018b). For example, 
estimated anthropogenic GHG emissions due to past and ongoing emissions is 
currently increasing at 0.2°C per decade according to IPCC’s data released on  
8 October 2018 (IPCC, 2018a). Furthermore, the impact on the environment is 
considered to be progressively severe, pervasive and irreversible (Department of 
Environmental Affairs, 2016).  
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Various scientific and intergovernmental organisations have been formed to provide 
scientific information and guidance on climate change to policy makers (IPCC, 1990). 
Examples include the IPCC and the UNFCCC. These two organisations have 
coordinated their actions and were instrumental in developing the Kyoto Protocol and 
the Paris Agreement. Background information on the IPCC, the UNFCCC, the Kyoto 
Protocol and the Paris Agreement will follow below.  
CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENTIFIC AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
ORGANISATIONS  
 
The IPCC was formed by the World Meteorological Organization and the United 
Nations Environmental Programme in 1989 to establish a peer-review basis for 
scientific literature to help evaluate the state of climate science (IPCC, 2014b). Since 
1989, the IPCC has released five full assessments on climate change. The scope and 
number of contributors to each assessment completed by the IPCC has added to the 
credibility of their work. The early work of the IPCC concentrated on assessing the 
direct impact of climate change on temperature, rainfall and the resultant impact on 
humans, plants and animals (IPCC, 2014b). However, the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment 
Report indicates a shift in research to further understanding of how the effects of 
climate change are transmitted to world trade and this transferal (IPCC, 2014b). This 
transferal therefore creates the context for this research. Given the above information, 
the IPCC is the main authority for the study of climate science.  
The IPCC’s assessments on climate change have called for anthropogenic sources of 
GHG to be limited. In recognition of this need for reduction, the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was formed by the 
International community in 1992 (Lisa & Schipper, 2006). The UNFCCC operates as 
a multilateral treaty calling for greater transparency in addressing climate change 
through a framework of global legal policy (Gupta & Mason, 2016). The majority of the 
IPCC’s work, since its first assessment on climate change, has focused on mitigation 
measures for climate change and not adaption measures (Lisa & Schipper, 2006). 
Where ‘mitigation of climate change’ requires human intervention to reduce the 
sources of GHG emissions, ‘adaption’ is understood to be the process of adjustment 
due to the climate and its effects (IPCC, 2014a, p. 118 & p. 125). Similarly, the 
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UNFCCC’s policy on climate change is primarily a mitigation policy to limit GHG (Lisa 
& Schipper, 2006).  
In the United Framework Convention on Climate Change Article 2, the UNFCCC states 
that its ultimate objective is “to achieve stabilisation of greenhouse gas concentrations 
in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference 
with the climate system” (UNFCCC, 1995, p. 5). This long-term perspective of the 
UNFCCC’s climate policy encapsulates the key scientific, economic and political 
components of the climate change debate (Oppenheimer & Petsonk, 2005). The 
UNFCCC facilitates climate mitigation (Hermwille, Obergassel & Ott, 2015). At the 
level of nation states this goal is achieved by implementing treaties and, subsequently, 
facilitates the development of national laws for climate change mitigation (Hermwille 
et al., 2015). Two recent UNFCCC treaties, in line with Article 2, are the Kyoto Protocol 
and the Paris Agreement.  
The Kyoto Protocol, a sub-treaty under the UNFCCC, was negotiated on 
11  December 1997 at the third session of the Conference of Parties (COP 3) in Kyoto, 
Japan (UNFCCC, 1998). The Kyoto Protocol laid down mandatory emissions 
reduction targets to be achieved during the period from 2008 to 2012 (Gupta & Mason, 
2016) and was the first International treaty to try and limit GHG emissions (Barrett, 
1998). Eight years later, on 16 February 2005, in accordance with Article 23, the Kyoto 
Protocol was effective (Spash, 2016; UNFCCC, 1998).  
The Kyoto Protocol promised substantial emission reductions for the developed world 
compared to “business-as-usual emissions” (Barrett, 1998, p. 1). Supporters of the 
Kyoto Protocol praised it for its incorporation of targets and timetables for the ceilings 
of GHG emissions and deadlines for the targets to be achieved (Böhringer, 2003). The 
proponents of the agreement suggest that the Kyoto Protocol was a “reasonable first 
step” (Rosen, 2015, p. 2). However, the majority criticised the Kyoto Protocol as being 
flawed because it was considered economically inefficient, politically impractical and 
inadequate to address the issue of global warming (Böhringer, 2003; Rosen, 2015). 
For example, there were inconsistencies in its application in different countries. Many 
nations failed to ratify the Kyoto Protocol (e.g. United States); others participated in 
negotiations, withdrew and then re-joined the Kyoto Protocol later (e.g. Australia); 
while others were not required by the Kyoto Protocol to reduce their emissions at all 
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(e.g. China, India and the rest of the developing world) (Rosen, 2015). Moreover, 
developing countries were exempt from creating binding emission targets under the 
Kyoto Protocol, despite accounting for a growing share of emissions (Böhringer, 
2003). Even with the introduction of the UNFCCC and the negotiations of the Kyoto 
Protocol emissions, GHG emissions continued to rise steadily (Falkner, 2016). 
Something more was needed. 
At the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP-21) to the UNFCCC, held on  
12 December 2015, a new climate treaty was agreed to: The Paris Agreement 
(Falkner, 2016; Wolfgang et al., 2016). The debate around climate change has been 
strengthened by the ratification of the Paris Agreement which acknowledges that 
domestic politics around climate change vary from nation to nation and, therefore, 
allows countries to set their own climate change mitigation strategies (Falkner, 2016). 
In terms of Article Two of the Agreement, national parties undertake to hold to the 
average global temperature increase to below 2°C while “recognising that this would 
significantly reduce the risks and impact of climate change” (UNFCCC, 2015, p. 5). 
The Paris Agreement is the first treaty negotiated in 25 years that envisages all 
countries partaking in climate action (Wolfgang et al., 2016) and has been adopted by 
195 countries as at 18 December 2018 (Gupta & Mason, 2016; UK Telegraph, 2018; 
UN, 2018). The Paris Agreement is, therefore, considered a turning point for climate 
action (DEA, 2016), particularly, since under the Kyoto Protocol, only 35 countries 
were  prepared to limit their greenhouse gas emissions (Spash, 2016).  
A further difference between the Paris Agreement and the Kyoto Protocol is that under 
the Paris Agreement developing countries must commit to reducing their emissions 
(Stowe, 2015). The national parties of the Paris Agreement aim to limit GHG emissions 
as soon as possible and it was acknowledged that developing countries will likely take 
longer to achieve this (UNFCCC, 2015) because they have not been previously 
engaged in climate mitigation strategies and some are prone to a reliance on fossil 
fuels (Hermwille et al., 2015). Moreover, the Paris Agreement signals that, despite the 
global challenge, a transition into a low-carbon economy is possible. Article 2 of the 
Paris Agreement stipulates that parties will make finance available for the transition to 
climate-resilient development (CDP, 2017b; DEA, 2016; UNFCCC, 2015). 
Furthermore, in line with the UNFCCC’s mission for greater transparency for climate 
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change (UNFCCC, 2015), the Paris Agreement requires national parties to 
communicate their contributions to the UNFCCC in terms of Article 4 of the Agreement. 
This disclosure is presented every five years (UNFCCC, 2015).  
This sub-section aimed to detail what climate change and its history is through a 
discussion of both climate change fundamentals and the formation of some scientific 
and intergovernmental organisations. The rest of this review will attempt to establish 
how climate change is relevant in South Africa and how voluntary disclosure plays a 
role in addressing climate change.  
CLIMATE CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA  
 
Climate change effects are evident in South Africa. The IPCC (2007) established  that 
countries within the Southern African region are currently experiencing longer dryer 
seasons and more uncertain rainfall than that in the past which is forcing adaptive 
measures to be implemented by these countries (IPCC, 2007). The African continent 
is particularly vulnerable to climate change (Eskom, 2011). Factors such as a lack of 
infrastructure, under-development, poor disaster management processes and lack of 
institutional capacity, indicate that Africa generally has a limited ability to respond and 
adapt to climate change (Eskom, 2011; UNEP, 2012).  
Temperature changes, rainfall variations and rising sea levels are already impacting 
South Africa (National Planning Commission, 2011). This situation has a resultant 
effect on South Africa’s food security, health infrastructure and water resources (DEA, 
2015; Ziervogel et al., 2014).  
South Africa, like many other developing countries, is susceptible to the impact of 
climate change (DEA, 2017). Further evidence from the Global Climate Risk Index 
ranked South Africa as the seventh African country most affected by climate change 
(Kreft, Eckstein & Melchior, 2017). Furthermore, South Africa has high per capita GHG 
emissions compared to other African and global countries (Ziervogel et al., 2014). This 
fact has attracted the attention of the South African government for a number of years 
(Ziervogel et al., 2014). As a middle income developing country suffering from climate 
change, national development is necessary, particularly given South Africa’s high 
levels of poverty and social inequality (DEA, 2011b, 2011a; Ziervogel et al., 2014).  
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South Africa has a role to play in becoming a low carbon economy by developing a 
national response to climate change. In 1998 the DEA signed the UNFCCC and in 
July 2002 acceded to the Kyoto Protocol (DEA, 2004; Eskom, 2011). In line with these 
International treaties, the South African DEA produced a government white paper4 on 
how to deal with climate change in South Africa (DEA, 2004). The white paper, 
together with the National Development Plan for 2030, was released in 2011 and 
details how South Africa needs to mobilise its financial, human and knowledge 
resources for an effective response to climate change (DEA, 2011a, 2017).  
The South African DEA determined that the national response should be a mitigation 
of climate change, rather than adaption to climate change (DEA, 2011a). Therefore, 
the South African DEA’s mitigation approach includes defining desired emission 
reductions for each significant sector of the South African economy and adopting a 
carbon budget approach for companies in the relevant sectors (DEA, 2011a). A carbon 
budget is the “tolerable quantity of GHG emissions that can be emitted in total over a 
specified time” (WWF, 2014, p. 1). The South African DEA further requires companies 
from each significant sector of the South African economy, as mentioned above, to 
prepare and submit mitigation plans that detail how they intend to achieve the desired 
emissions reduction (DEA, 2011a). However, while the white paper proposed 
proactive steps to reduce GHG emissions, it did not bind South Africa to a specific 
emission reduction target.   
After the South African white paper had been operating for a few years the Paris 
Agreement came into effect. Following changes in International climate change 
treaties, the then South African Minister of Environmental Affairs, signed the Paris 
Agreement on  26 April 2016 (UNFCCC, 2017). By signing the Paris agreement, South 
Africa has declared its commitment to implementing policies to enable  transition to a 
low carbon economy (DEA, 2017; NBI, 2016; South African Government News 
Agency, 2017; UNFCCC, 2017). To satisfy South Africa’s commitment to the 
UNFCCC, the DEA has been producing an annual climate change report (DEA, 2019). 
This annual report details the country-wide monitoring and evaluation of South Africa’s 
 
4 The term ‘white paper’ refers to the broad statements of government policy drafted by the relevant 
government department (The Guardian, 2009).   
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transition to a lower carbon economy in order to achieve South Africa’s first five year 
emissions reduction target to the UNFCCC (DEA, 2016).  
BUSINESS AND CLIMATE CHANGE  
 
Before the early 1990s, the climate change issue was generally considered to have 
been neglected by businesses worldwide (Kolk, Levy & Pinkse, 2008). This situation 
was potentially due to the fact that companies operated purely in the pursuit of financial 
growth (Simpson, 2018). Therefore, societal and scientific debate about climate 
change has, in recent years, centred on companies and corporations in the private 
sector (Hahn et al., 2015).  
The societal pressure for businesses to respond to climate change is driven by 
government policies, pressure from consumers and other stakeholders (Less & 
Kauffmann, 2009). The rationale behind this pressure has been that businesses need 
to implement effective responses to climate change. Their response needs to harness 
the financial, technological and organisational resources of their business to address 
their exposure to climate change and limit further contribution to climate change 
(Okereke et al., 2012).  
Climate change could result in a direct change in a company’s external environment. 
This transformation will impact on its ability to acquire, retain and grow the capitals 
that are required to create value and, therefore, result in a cost to the company 
(Promethium Carbon & The Climate Disclosure Standards Board, 2013). This negative 
outcome indicates that organisations should effectively manage their environmental 
impact and natural resource stewardship (Ernst and Young & Boston College Centre, 
2014). While the IPCC (2014b) is uncertain about what the global economic impact of 
climate change will be, it is anticipated that the financial costs of climate change will 
be carried by companies in the private sector (IPCC, 2014b).  
Organisations will be affected by climate change, albeit in different ways (Wittneben & 
Kiyar, 2009). For example, a financial service organisation may need to introduce 
insurance for climate change effects, while a food retailer may need to source 
alternative suppliers of food. Therefore, climate change poses potential strategic 
effects on organisations (Kolk & Pinkse, 2004). Prior research concurs that the impact 
of climate change will vary for companies; and that this impact can be attributed to 
8 
 
different factors such as size, location and industry-type (Oreskes, 2004; Wittneben & 
Kiyar, 2009). Consequently, it is important for any business to look at its operations 
and its production of GHGs to limit its contribution to climate change (Wittneben & 
Kiyar, 2009). Climate change consequences for companies are fast becoming more 
immediate and tangible than ever before (Halldórsson & Kovács, 2010).  
South Africa’s involvement in the Paris Agreement and climate change management 
has called for the involvement of civil society and the private sector (DEA, 2017). The 
private sector together with non-governmental organisations have made “significant 
financial contributions” to lower carbon emissions in South Africa (RSA Department of 
Environmental Affairs, 2016, p. 19). Similarly, South Africa’s private sector has been 
a forerunner in responding to climate change (CDP, 2017b; DEA, 2017). The political 
and public attention that climate change has attracted has resulted in the development 
of voluntary carbon disclosure initiatives such as the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP)  
(Hahn et al., 2015). The South African DEA (2017) stated that they will evaluate the 
private sector’s transition to a lower carbon economy based on their participation and 
activities disclosed in their responses to the CDP (DEA, 2017). Given that societal 
pressure has resulted in the development of voluntary carbon disclosure initiatives, 
the next aspect of this review will expand on what is meant by the term ‘voluntary 
disclosure’ and explain who the CDP is.  
VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE  
 
Voluntary disclosure occurs when information is provided by a company even though 
there is no legal requirement to produce this disclosure (Meek, Roberts & Gray, 1995). 
Voluntary disclosure, therefore, represents management’s choice to provide 
information that it deems to be decision-useful (Meek et al., 1995). There is an 
information gap between information providers (managers) and users (stakeholders) 
because companies have a separation of ownership and management (Elfeky, 2017). 
Hence, voluntary disclosures are often aimed at managing the conflicts among 
stakeholders (Chow & Wong-Boren, 1987).  
Globally, voluntary carbon disclosure gained corporate attention following the 
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol in 2005 (Hahn et al., 2015). Prior research indicates 
that companies headquartered in countries that were signatories of the Kyoto Protocol 
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tended to disclose more carbon-related information than those in non-signatory 
countries (Hahn & Lülfs, 2014). The disclosure by these companies acknowledges the 
importance of the ‘global warming’ issue and provides support for the conclusions 
reached by the IPPC and Kyoto Protocol (Ihlen, 2009). Therefore, voluntary carbon 
disclosure propels companies to measure and understand their impact on the 
environment (Simpson, 2018). Moreover, this disclosure indicates to stakeholders that 
the company is “preparing for the future, cutting costs and building resilience” 
(Simpson, 2018, p. 1).   
The voluntary reporting of climate change developed from the debate over the 
relationship between business and its environment. In South Africa, carbon disclosure, 
which is an aspect of sustainability reporting, is entirely voluntary and, therefore, the 
reporting of climate change is also voluntary (Dillard & Brown, 2013).  
All JSE listed companies must comply with the King Code (IoDSA, 2016; JSE, 2017). 
King IV is the most recent version of the King Code and is effective on or after  
1 April 2017 (IoDSA, 2016). Of relevance for this research is that King IV recognises 
climate change as a driver of change and states that “continuing business as usual” in 
light of climate change is simply “no longer possible” (IoDSA, 2016, p. 3). In addition 
to this, Principle 3 of King IV states that “the governing body should ensure that the 
organisation is, and is seen to be, a responsible corporate citizen” (IoDSA, 2016, p. 
45). Furthermore, the recommended practice suggests that all JSE listed companies 
should have oversight and be monitoring their impact on the environment in order to 
be, and to be seen as, a responsible corporate citizen (IoDSA, 2016). King IV is a set 
of voluntary principles and all users must demonstrate their compliance with these 
principles or explain any instances of non-compliance (IoDSA, 2016). There are no 
sanctions or penalties if a company does not comply with King IV, thus King IV merely 
suggests practices for companies which again demonstrates that climate change 
disclosure in South Africa is entirely voluntary. However, there has been a growing 
demand for better corporate sustainability disclosure due to the increased importance 
of corporate social responsibility (Manning, 2017). 
THE CARBON DISCLOSURE PROJECT (CDP)  
The CDP is considered to be an important player in voluntary carbon disclosure (Hahn 
et al., 2015). The CDP is a global not-for-profit company whose primary focus is to 
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work with the finance and investment community (NBI, 2015). The CDP wants to help 
create a world where capital is efficiently allocated to ensure “long-term prosperity 
instead of having a short-term gain at the expense of the environment” (National 
Business Intiative, 2015, p. 2). The CDP sends out three separate questionnaires 
pertaining to climate change, forests and water security to cities and companies 
worldwide (CDP, 2017b). This practice is conducted on behalf of 803 institutional 
signatories representing assets in excess of US $100 trillion (Cotter & Najah, 2012). 
The CDP believes that the collection of accurate information and its related disclosure 
is an important element of a company’s responsible conduct (Kauffmann & Less, 
2010).  
This principle aligns with the CDP’s climate change questionnaire which aims to 
encourage companies to disclose and measure information relating to climate change. 
The CDP’s hope is that as companies are recording their emissions, they will be more 
aware of their operations’ contribution to climate change and that, over time, a 
transition towards a low carbon economy is possible (CDP, 2017b). The forest 
questionnaire encourages companies to disclose information regarding deforestation 
risks to encourage companies to reduce these risks and support the environment 
(CDP, 2017c). The water security questionnaire aims to enable companies and 
investors to understand their role in delivering a water-secure world (CDP, 2017a). 
More than 570 cities, 100 states and 6 300 companies world-wide participate in 
disclosing their environmental data every year to the CDP (Appleby, 2018; CDP, 
2017b; Cotter & Najah, 2012). In South Africa the CDP selects the JSE Top 100 
companies by market capitalisation each year and requests that they participate in the 
CDP questionnaire (NBI, 2015). The CDP has been operational since 2001 (Gupta & 
Mason, 2016) and due to the positive response from companies and cities, they offer 
the largest directory of environmental information (Doda, Gennaioli, Gouldson, Grover 
& Sullivan, 2016; Hahn et al., 2015). The completed company questionnaires are 
available on the CDP’s website. The CDP makes use of a scoring methodology to 
incentivise companies participating in its questionnaire to measure and manage their 
impact on climate change, water and forests (CDP, 2016b). Detailed scoring 
methodologies are available to companies responding to the CDP so companies know 
what they are aiming for (CDP, 2016b). Following the discussion of climate change 
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and voluntary disclosure, the next aspect of this study will expand on the theoretical 
basis of voluntary disclosure.  
THEORETICAL BASIS OF VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE   
Upon reviewing the literature on carbon disclosure the research of Hahn et al. (2015) 
noted that a significant number of articles did not state any theoretical foundation for 
their research and instead relied on prior empirical evidence to develop their 
hypotheses (Hahn et al., 2015). To this end, this study discusses three theoretical 
foundations relating to the issues of carbon disclosure, namely: Institutional theories, 
Economic theories and Socio-political theories of voluntary disclosure. While each of 
these theories will be examined separately, this study acknowledges that the 
determinants of these theories are not mutually exclusive (Hahn et al., 2015).  
Institutional theories 
 
Institutional theories state that an organisation is driven by the requirements of 
different institutions and not only the organisation’s aim to maximise profits 
(Jepperson, 1991). This claim implies that institutions create pressure which cause 
organisations to adjust their behaviours and social performance (Jepperson, 1991). 
The idea of ‘social performance’ is defined as a company satisfying the needs, 
expectations and demands from institutions beyond those required directly by the 
company for its product and market (Ullmann, 1985, p. 3). By performing in a socially 
acceptable manner, corporations increase their legitimacy and survival prospects. 
Therefore, there is value for these companies in responding to institutional pressure 
(Tolbert & Zucker, 1996).  
With voluntary disclosures, research has examined the role of institutional actors, such 
as the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP), who use this disclosure as a method of 
monitoring companies’ climate change mitigation actions and performance (Guenther, 
Guenther, Schiemann & Weber, 2016; Gupta & Mason, 2016; Luo et al., 2012; Stanny 
& Ely, 2008). Companies who voluntarily disclose information about their activities 
meet the demands imposed by institutional stakeholders for information and are 
essentially responding to public pressure. Consequently, legitimacy theory and 
voluntary disclosure coincide. As the purpose of voluntary environmental disclosure is 
to manage the public’s impression of a company’s activities (Cormier, Magnan, & Van 
Velthoven, 2005), investors and stakeholders will utilise this information to gain a more 
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thorough understanding of the company’s carbon performance and its responses to 
climate change (Jaggi, Allini, Macchioni & Zampella, 2017). Furthermore, voluntary 
carbon disclosures should reduce information asymmetry and enable investors to 
make investment decisions after evaluating a company’s risk exposure to climate 
change (Jaggi et al., 2017). Environmental information disseminated in voluntary 
disclosures further alleviates information asymmetry and contributes to investment 
decisions because it helps interpret managerial behaviour (Giannarakis, Zafeiriou, 
Arabatzis & Partalidou, 2018).  
The last factor to consider in relation to institutional theories relates to the quality of 
the disclosures produced. High quality carbon disclosures are those in which 
consistent methodologies are used and all information and assumptions included in 
the report are explained (Jaggi, et al.,  2017). Furthermore, the response to institutional 
pressure is consistent with either what other companies in the same industry have 
disclosed and/or what companies have disclosed because of routine and regulation 
(Cormier et al., 2005).  
Economic theories  
Economic theories of voluntary disclosure propose that organisations evaluate the 
costs associated with the voluntary disclosure of environmental information to 
interested stakeholders against the related benefits (Clarkson, Li, Richardson & 
Vasvari, 2008). The possible costs incurred by a company to produce carbon 
information could include human resources costs, investment into implementing a 
standard from the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI)5 (Dagilienė, 2013), and costs 
associated with the value of the information provided. The more scrutiny a company 
is under from stakeholders, the higher the cost of not disclosing environmental 
information (Stanny & Ely, 2008).  
Carbon disclosure, such as those contained in a sustainability report, is meant to 
provide a complete and balanced picture of the corporate’s sustainable environmental 
performance (Hahn & Lülfs, 2014). However, because of the voluntary element of this 
 
5 The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) is an organisation which has developed a framework for 
companies to utilise in the development of voluntary reporting to improve comparability, usefulness and 
quality of information reported on environmental, social and economic impact and performance (Willis, 
2003). 
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report, ‘greenwashing’6 can be prevalent as managers tend to opportunistically not 
report on the ‘bad’ sustainability information (Hahn & Lülfs, 2014). Therefore, potential 
reputational costs exist if investors consider the information to be ‘greenwashing’.  
The benefits of disclosure should also factor into a company’s decision to voluntary 
disclose information because these benefits may outweigh the costs. For example, 
signalling theory proposes that investors and analysts value proactive disclosure as it 
attempts to solve the asymmetry of information, created by the separation of 
ownership and management (Clarkson et al., 2008; Hahn et al., 2015). By providing 
this disclosure, management appears honest and trustworthy because they are seen 
to be more transparent and reducing information asymmetry7 (Hahn et al., 2015). 
Thus, because stakeholders value transparency, signalling can improve 
management’s reputation. Furthermore, with management disclosing information 
about the environment it is also signalling that management is taking responsibility for 
environmental issues (Hahn et al., 2015).  
It should also be noted that costs of disclosing climate change information must not 
be confused with the costs of mitigating climate change. The costs and challenges of 
mitigating climate change can be reduced with substantial reductions of GHG 
emissions over the next few decades (IPCC, 2014b). Furthermore, the extent of these 
costs vary depending on the methodologies and assumptions applied by the IPCC in 
making its estimates (IPCC, 2014b). While individual companies are more likely to be 
able to determine their costs for mitigating climate change, few companies have 
recorded these costs in their disclosure (Stanny & Ely, 2008).  
In terms of the literature which includes theoretical underpinning, much of the literature 
which examines economic theories of voluntary disclosure suggests a relationship 
between financial performance metrics and voluntary disclosure. These studies 
indicated the following four findings:   
 
6 ‘Greenwashing’ is a term which was first used in 1986 by Jay Westernveld which refers to companies 
presenting themselves as environmental stewards, when in fact they are engaging in environmentally 
unsustainable practices (Watson, 2016).  
 
7  ‘Information asymmetry’ is a concept which refers to the situation in which one individual possesses 
more or better information than  another individual (Do, 2003). 
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• There is a negative relationship between economic performance (as measured 
by return on assets (ROA)) and the CDP climate change score (Jaggi et al., 
2017). Jaggi, et al. (2017) conducted a longitudinal analysis of listed Italian 
firms.  
• Similarly economic pressure is inversely associated with the decision to 
disclose to the CDP (Luo et al., 2012). This result comes from the study 
conducted by Luo et al. (2012) who investigated the Global 500 companies8.  
• Predicators of carbon disclosure included profitability and affiliations with a 
carbon-intensive industry (Hahn et al., 2015). Furthermore the most commonly 
applied control variables were market-to-book (MtoB) ratios, leverage and size 
(Hahn et al., 2015). These results come from Hahn et al. (2015) who recorded 
contradictory findings. They examined 13 studies which analysed the 
relationship between financial performance and carbon disclosure and 
discovered mostly insignificant findings (Hahn et al., 2015).  
• The size of the company is considered to be an influential factor when 
examining climate change disclosure according to the results of the study 
conducted by Stanny and Ely (2008) for the US Standard and Poor’s (S&P) 500 
companies.  
Economic theories of voluntary disclosure, therefore, suggest that companies need to 
balance the costs of disclosing against the benefits of disclosing. Furthermore, each 
of these economic determinants (return on assets, industry, size and leverage) imply 
a relationship between financial performance and voluntary disclosure.  
Socio-political theories  
 
Socio-political theories of voluntary disclosure explain that the disclosure produced by 
organisations is due to political and/or social pressure from multiple stakeholders 
(Hahn & Lülfs, 2014; Hahn et al., 2015). Disclosure produced in response to such 
coercion tends to vary based on the social or political focus of the time, particularly 
when the disclosure is not required by regulation (Gray, Kouhy, & Lavers, 1995). 
 
8 The Global 500 companies consists largest 500 companies globally by market cap as per the CDP’s 
2009 report (Luo et al., 2012).  
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Socio-political theories can be further subdivided into stakeholder theory and 
legitimacy theory.  
Stakeholder theory refers to an organisation implementing different strategies in the 
interests of different stakeholder groups (Roberts, 1992). According to stakeholder 
theory, the social pressure for climate change information explains the need for carbon 
disclosure (Hahn et al., 2015). The urgency of a company’s response depends on the 
power of the stakeholders (Hahn et al., 2015) and thus varies from one company to 
another.  
Legitimacy theory refers to how the actions of an organisation are considered 
appropriate because of societal norms and values (Suchman, 1995). Legitimacy 
theory also motivates for carbon disclosure in reaction to external social or political 
pressure and improves the public’s perception of a company’s sustainability 
performance (Hahn et al., 2015; Hummel & Schlick, 2016; Suchman, 1995).  
Environmental disclosure essentially maintains a social contract between the 
company and society (Hahn et al., 2015). The higher the level of stakeholder 
engagement, the higher the incentive for companies to safeguard their legitimacy 
(Manning, 2017). If this contract between the company and society is broken, 
companies will be under greater scrutiny (Hahn et al., 2015; Stanny & Ely, 2008). 
Larger companies are pressured to legitimize their actions since they are usually more 
visible and have greater media exposure (Hahn et al., 2015). Therefore, the size of 
the company is a determinant that needs to be considered under legitimacy theory, 
because there is a greater probability that larger companies will have carbon 
disclosures (Stanny & Ely, 2008).  
Institutional theories, economic theories, and socio-political theories all play a role in 
influencing companies to disclose information about climate change. This aspect of 
this review aimed to define each theoretical framework and demonstrate how all three 
frameworks are relevant for voluntary climate change disclosure.  
CONCLUSION 
The climate is changing due to increased amounts of anthropogenic GHGs released 
into the atmosphere (NASA, 1998; Stern, 2006). The changing climate has required 
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intergovernmental co-ordination of mitigation strategies under the Kyoto Protocol and 
the Paris Agreement.  
In South Africa climate change is notable in temperature changes, rainfall variations 
and rising sea levels (National Planning Commission, 2011). As a result the South 
African DEA acceded to the Kyoto Protocol (DEA, 2004; Eskom, 2011) and signed the 
Paris Agreement declaring its commitment to becoming a low carbon economy 
(UNFCCC, 2017).  
Societal pressure has driven business to respond to climate change and limit further 
contribution to climate change (Less & Kauffmann, 2009; Okereke et al., 2012). 
Voluntary climate change disclosure is used by companies to acknowledge the gravity 
of the climate issue and to offer support for the conclusions reached by the IPPC and 
Kyoto Protocol (Ihlen, 2009). Furthermore, many companies in the private sector 
voluntarily disclose carbon information to appease stakeholders who want to see a 
response to climate change (Chow & Wong-Boren, 1987).  
The CDP is an example of voluntary disclosure which was discussed. Three 
theoretical foundations were reviewed, namely institutional, economic and socio-
political theories. Prior literature has made use of the CDP for its scoring (Luo et al., 
2012; Stanny & Ely, 2008), but tended not to incorporate any of the qualitative 
questions from within the CDP questionnaire. Prior research also tended to rely on 
prior empirical evidence to develop their hypotheses (Hahn et al., 2015) as opposed 
to a theoretical foundation. Therefore, this study aims to consider both the CDP score 
and the qualitative questions in its analysis of voluntary climate change disclosure and 
will incorporate the necessary theoretical frameworks in its design.  
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METHODOLOGY 
The literature review has indicated a gap in the research of voluntary climate change 
disclosure to CDP– namely that the research tended to be limited exclusively to a 
quantitative or qualitative approach and limited research has analysed the responses 
within the CDP questionnaire. Therefore, this study aims to add to the body of literature 
by answering the following research question: 
Which factors, either company specific or individual company responses, within 
the CDP questionnaire influence a high CDP climate change score for South 
African companies 
To answer this question, the CDP score for the Top 100 JSE listed companies will be 
assessed against selected companies’ characteristics and their responses to 
questions asked within the CDP questionnaire. The null hypothesis (H0) is that no 
factors influence the score, while the alternative hypothesis (H1) is that certain factors 
do influence the score. Next, a description of the data collected, the variables chosen 
and the statistical methods to be employed will be presented.   
DATA COLLECTION  
To begin, a sample of South African companies was selected. To do this, a full 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) listing as at 31 March 20179 was obtained from 
the INET BFA portal10. These companies were then ranked by market capitalisation 
(market cap) to select the Top 100 companies. This research considers it appropriate 
to focus on the JSE Top 100 companies because this Group represents 95.37% of the 
JSE market11. Moreover, the literature reviewed also demonstrated that larger 
companies are more likely to disclose information about climate change because they 
are under greater “scrutiny” from investors (Stanny & Ely, 2008, p. 2). For each of the 
companies, select company specific variables were sourced from the INET BFA portal. 
Additionally, the CDP climate change programme score and individual company 
responses to the climate change questionnaire were obtained from the CDP’s website. 
 
9 The last year-end that a company can select in the 2017 CDP climate change questionnaire is  
31 March 2017.  
10 INET BFA is an online database and is the leading provider of African market data (Knott, 2016). 
11 This percentage is calculated by summing the market cap of the JSE Top 100 over the sum of the 
market cap of full JSE listing as per the INET BFA on 31 March 2017 i.e. 13 901 051 862 024/14 
575 916 810 342= 95.37%.  
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The first ten questionnaires were obtained freely from the CDP website, thereafter, 
access to further questionnaires was obtained by subscribing to the CDP for a fee. 
The rationale for using the CDP for this information is explained in the next section.  
THE CDP QUESTIONNAIRE 
The rationale for using data from the CDP is threefold: Firstly, there are 6 300 
companies who elect to participate in the CDP’s climate change programme every 
year which indicates that the CDP is a source of company specific voluntary 
environmental disclosure information (CDP, 2017b). Secondly, because the nature of 
the disclosure made to the CDP is via a questionnaire, there is a lack of discretion in 
the companies’ answers, which allows for simplified data collection and comparison. 
Thirdly, there is extensive comparative data available since companies have been 
disclosing information to the CDP since 2001. This data has also been used in prior 
research (Luo et al., 2012; Stanny & Ely, 2008). Moreover, the CDP has been 
endorsed by 237 companies worth $6.3 trillion in assets, following the release of the 
recommendations for “voluntary and consistent climate-related financial risk 
disclosures” from the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosure (TCFD) 
(CDSB, 2018, p. 4; Simpson, 2017).  Finally the CDP’s scoring allows companies to 
compare themselves year on year and similarly allows comparisons to be made 
between companies (Appleby, 2018). This corresponds with the findings in the 
literature review because in terms of institutional theories what other companies in the 
same industry have disclosed and what companies have disclosed because of routine 
and regulation often encourages voluntary disclosure (Cormier et al., 2005).   
The CDP climate change score is an awarded rank with ranges between A and D. 
Each rank corresponds to the CDP’s assessment of the company’s progress towards 
environmental stewardship (CDP, 2016b). The highest score (A) indicates leadership 
in climate change disclosure and their disclosure indicates a thorough understanding 
of their climate change risks and opportunities with formulated and implemented 
strategies to mitigate and capitalise on the aforementioned risks and opportunities 
(CDP, 2016b). The second highest score (B) indicates disclosure of good 
environmental management that is relevant and applicable for the company (CDP, 
2016b). The third highest score (C) indicates that the company has disclosed how its 
business impacts the environment but it does not include any actions to address the 
environmental issues beyond the assessment of the business risk (CDP, 2016b). Next, 
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the score D indicates that company has achieved only the disclosure level of 
environmental stewardship (CDP, 2016b). The lowest score “E” means that the 
response was received by the CDP but not scored for a multitude of reasons, such as 
a late submission (CDP, 2016a). The CDP’s scoring, therefore, serves to provide 
investors with a measure which indicates a company’s commitment to environmental 
stewardship disclosure in terms of climate change. Consequently, the CDP climate 
change score will be the dependent variable for this study.  
The CDP’s questionnaire is a standardised set of questions, hence there is an 
opportunity to compare companies’ answers across questions. This fact is beneficial 
because voluntary disclosure on climate change in sustainability reports is completed 
using the companies’ own discretion (Amran & Haniffa, 2011). This practice results in 
different information being presented by different companies and limits the 
comparability of such disclosures. The CDP has scoring methodology documents 
which detail how each question within the questionnaire is awarded a point but the 
majority of the points are awarded for the  “company-specific explanations” because 
this evidence substantiates a company’s climate change risk management (CDP, 
2016, p. 8).  
Prior research using this climate change data tended to only make use of the final 
climate change score provided by the CDP (Luo et al., 2012; Stanny & Ely, 2008) and 
not the individual company responses within the questionnaire, which is one example 
of how this study is contributing to the body of literature in this research area. 
Furthermore, this study will examine the responses made by South African listed 
companies. Prior research has concentrated on Forbes Global 500 firms and US S&P 
500 firms (Luo et al., 2012; Stanny & Ely, 2008), so this research enables a focus on 
South African companies. South African companies have been responding to the 
CDP’s climate change programme since 2007 (NBI, 2015). The CDP considers South 
Africa’s domestic companies to be “unquestionably performing on a par with their 
global peers” and “in many cases outperforming them” (NBI, 2016, p. 2). If it can be 
determined what factors influence a higher CDP score for South African companies, 
these factors might indicate the reason as to why South African companies are 
outperforming their global peers. Consequently, other companies in other countries 
could focus on improving those factors.  
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The CDP climate change programme has been around since 2001, and the CDP have 
made changes to the questionnaire over the years. The most recent CDP 
questionnaire data available is the 2017 climate change questionnaire which has 
remained substantially the same since 2013. Therefore, this study will analyse the 
CDP questionnaires between 2013 and 2017 (‘the period’) to allow for comparability.  
In total a responding company must answer about 77 questions in the CDP climate 
change questionnaire. Each of these questions were assessed by the researcher 
firstly for those which are comparable and complete across the period 2013 to 2017. 
Furthermore, only questions which all companies must answer were selected to allow 
objective comparability across different companies. As a result of this, 24 questions 
remained which were then assessed to determine which ones aligned with the 
disclosure theories discussed in the literature review. 21 questions were disregarded. 
This resulted in three questions to be included in this analysis, namely12:  
• Do you provide incentives for the management of climate change issues, 
including the attainment of targets? If so what kind of incentive is provided. This 
variable is referred to as the variable “incentive”. Introducing an incentive for 
management of climate change issues was called for by Deegan and Islam 
(2012), who stated that these inducements may provide the necessary 
motivation that institutional investors have been wanting. Deegan and Islam 
(2012) further stated that providing incentives is a consideration for institutional 
theory.  
• How far into the future are risks considered?  This practice is referred to as the 
variable “future risk”. How a company manages its future risk refers to one of 
 
12 The potential impact of mechanical correlation by incorporating three questions from within CDP 
questionnaire into the model has been considered. However, the following points indicate that the risk of 
mechanical correlation is low. Firstly, a Pearson correlation, Spearman correlation and point biserial 
correlation were examined and each of the three questions are not highly correlated with the CDP score. 
Secondly, these variables are incorporated into the model together with company specific factors which 
reduces this risk of mechanical correlation because the model is analysing more than just the three questions. 
Thirdly the CDP incorporates the answers to the questionnaire with a weighting system to derive the final CDP 
score. While in this model the answers to the three questions are coded and the CDP’s weightings are not 
used. Therefore, the three questions are incorporated differently in the model than how they are incorporate 
in the CDP score. Fourthly only three questions have been used in this model while there are 77 questions that 
are used to derive the final CDP score. The CDP scoring is a complex process and therefore the potential 
impact of using 3 of the questions in the model is lower. Finally, each of the three questions were selected due 
to a basis in theory. Therefore it can be concluded that the risk of mechanical correlation is low.   
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the strategies that is employed to manage their stakeholders in terms of 
stakeholder theories, one of the theories under socio-political theory (Roberts, 
1992). 
• Please provide the following information for the person that has signed off 
(approved) your CDP climate change response. This approval is referred to as 
the variable “key management”. This term “key management” is referred to in 
the CDP questionnaire, although it is not defined. The degree of management’s 
support for environmental activities can be used as an indicator of the quality 
of the climate change mitigation plan (Jacques, Campbell, Lober & Bynum, 
1997). Thus, understanding the level of key management involved in mitigating 
climate change is an indicator of the quality of the plan. However, it is important 
to note that generally the CEO is an expert in running the company and not 
necessarily an expert on managing climate change (Reynolds, 2018). 
Accordingly, a company should have a separate individual who is part of key 
management that is responsible for managing climate change risks in the 
business because he/she has the appropriate expertise (Reynolds, 2018). The 
person responsible for approving the CDP questionnaire indicates the 
company’s impressions about the importance of the company’s voluntary 
environmental disclosure. This aligns to institutional theory.  
The economic theories will be incorporated in other variables in the model.   
DATA CLEANING  
This section will detail how the final sample was selected. This study will be looking at 
the CDP scores over the full five-year period from 2013 to 2017. Over the period 
analysed, not all the JSE Top 100 companies responded annually to the CDP 
questionnaire. This is partially since the JSE Top 100 companies changes every year. 
Given a period of 5 years, a 100% response rate would equate to 500 company 
responses. However, only 305 responses were available. Furthermore, of the 305 
responses to the CDP, 63 responses were excluded because of incomplete 
information. Therefore, the final sample over the period consists of 242 responses. 
Appendix A includes a table indicating whether the company’s responses are included 
in the final sample of 242 or not.  
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The 242 responses can be disaggregated into the separate years with 50 responses 
in 2017, 53 in 2016, 55 in 2015, 38 in 2014, and 46 in 2013. The 242 responses are 
representative of 57 unique companies. Therefore, this study will only assess the 
results for these 57 companies. There is a potential limitation of scope due to the 
range13 analysed in this study and one can speculate that perhaps those companies 
not responding would likely have had poorer CDP scores and for that reason they did 
not submit or participate. This ambiguity is a recommended area for future research.  
Nonetheless, only analysing the 57 companies that responded to the CDP is 
considered appropriate because the aim of the study is to assess the factors 
determining the CDP score and this objective can still be achieved by limiting the 
analysis to these 57 unique companies, which will be referred as the ‘sampled 
companies’ for the remainder of this study. While this sample might be biased towards 
companies who partake in the CDP questionnaire and who have complete information, 
the purpose of this study is not to assess who is and who is not partaking in the CDP 
questionnaire. Rather the aim of this study is to determine if there are company specific 
or individual company responses within the CDP questionnaire which influence a high 
CDP climate change score. By examining the 57 unique companies this can still be 
achieved. Furthermore, South African companies who have been responding to the 
CDP are “consistently ahead of their responding global peers” (CDP, 2017b, p. 2), 
therefore there is value in conducting this analysis on the 57 unique companies.  
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
This section will present descriptive statistics of the sampled data and the variables 
included in the testing. The purpose is to determine which statistics tests is most 
appropriate. To begin, the dependant variable, the CDP score will be discussed.  
 
13 The term ‘range’ here refers to a statistic term ‘restriction of range’. Since this study is only using 
responding companies to the CDP, it implies that a criterion has been applied to limit the data in the 
population i.e. there has been a restriction of the range. Restriction of the range has a consequence 
for the interpretation of the results (Wiberg & Sundström, 2009).  Thus, the results can only be applied 
to companies like those in this study’s sample, i.e. they are the JSE Top 100 companies that 
responded to the CDP. This interpretation is still considered appropriate and simply needs to be borne 
in mind when reading the following chapters. 
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The CDP score which was ranked within a range between A and E, were recoded as 
A = 5, B = 4, C = 3, D = 2, and E = 114. Where 5 (corresponding to A) indicates better 
environmental stewardship and 1 (corresponding to E) indicates poorer environmental 
stewardship. This re-coding was implemented to enable statistical analysis within 
Stata15. The mean score of the 242 responses is 3.67 i.e. between B and C, with a 
standard deviation of 0.94 and a mode of 4 i.e. B. This result indicates that most of the 
companies scored in the B band, indicating good environmental management (CDP, 
2016a). A histogram of the CDP scores (the dependent variable in this study) is plotted 
in Figure 1 below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14  The CDP score is not strictly continuous, but for this analysis it is treated as a continuous variable. 
Many prior studies have treated ordinal type variables as continuous variables (Pasta, 2009). Thus, it 
is appropriate to treat the CDP score as a continuous variable for this study.  
15 Stata is a statistical software package (StataCorp, 2017).  
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Figure 1: Histogram of the CDP Score overall 
The histogram of the CDP scores plotted for the period overall in Figure 1 appears to 
be normally distributed with the data slightly skewed to the left. This deviance is further 
corroborated in Figure 2 which plots a histogram for the CDP scores per year. The 
slight deviation from the normal distribution is not an issue for the use of the model in 
this study, it merely informs the distribution of the residuals.   
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Figure 2: Histogram of the CDP Score per period 
Figure 2 shows that each year in the period reflects a normal distribution, with the data 
slightly skewed to the left, except for the 2016 year which indicates that there is not a 
normal distribution in that year. However, as the data is not going to be analysed per 
year but rather altogether in the statistical testing, this difference does not affect the 
method of testing used. Furthermore, Figure 2 reflects that in 2016 and 2017, more 
companies scored a 5 and no companies scored a 1 or a 2, when compared to years 
2013 to 201516. Supporting this observation, the mean scores for the periods from 
2013 to 2015 and 2016 to 2017 is 3.49 and 4.11 with a standard deviation of 0.97 and 
0.77 respectively. A possible explanation for this difference is the adoption of the Paris 
Agreement on 12 December 2015 (Wolfgang et al., 2016). The adoption of the Paris 
Agreement could have resulted in an increased focus on climate change disclosure. 
Given this change in scores over the period analysed, it is requisite to analyse the 
 
16 Therefore, this adds to the earlier discussion and suggests that there is a possibility of a restriction 
of range. Thus, the results can only be applied to companies like those in this study’s sample, i.e. the 
JSE Top 100 companies that responded to the CDP. 
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results by introducing an indicator variable to the data representing the Paris 
Agreement. Where the indicator would be 0 for the years 2013 to 2015 and 1 for the 
years 2016 and 2017. Appendix B shows the distributions of scores for these two sub-
periods indicating a normal distribution, with the data slightly skewed to the left.  
Therefore, the dependent variable reflects a slight deviation from the normal 
distribution. Understanding this distribution will inform the appropriate statistical 
model, which is discussed in the research approach.  
Next, information on each of the selected company specific variables and the three 
selected climate change questionnaire responses to be included in the testing are 
presented in Table 1. The variable name is shown in the first column, with further 
descriptive information on how that variable was determined and why it is appropriate 
to include in the testing in the remaining columns. The final column describes the 
related theories which inform the use of this variable. 
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Table 1: Variables 
Variable 
name   
Control/ 
independent 
variable   
Variable description   Explanation for inclusion, per the 
literature   
Related theories17 
Size Independent 
variable  
A continuous variable 
calculated as market 
capitalization over the 
shareholders’ equity. This ratio 
is often referred to as the market 
to book (MtoB) ratio.  
Prado-Lorenzo, Rodríguez-Domínguez, 
Gallego-Álvarez and García-Sánchez 
(2009) found that there is a higher 
volume of carbon information disclosed 
when a company has a lower MtoB ratio 
compared to companies that have a 
lower MtoB ratio.   
Socio-political theories: Companies which 
have  poor economic performance, as 
indicated by a lower MtoB ratio, tend to have 
a higher volume of environmental disclosure 
to make themselves more attractive to 
different stakeholders (Prado-Lorenzo et al., 
2009). This fact suggests that this disclosure 
varies based on the social focus of the time 
(Gray, Kouhy and Lavers, 1995).  
 
Foreign sales  
percentage  
(FSP) 
Independent 
variable   
A continuous variable 
calculated as total foreign sales, 
divided by total turnover of a 
company for the year.   
Companies with foreign sales are more 
likely to respond to the CDP 
questionnaire due to their greater level 
of “scrutiny” (Stanny & Ely, 2008, p. 2).  
Institutional theories: When there is a positive 
association between the degree of disclosure 
and foreign sales this situation suggests that 
global companies are likely to have a higher 
degree of environmental regulation (Stanny & 
Ely, 2008). This fact might suggest that these 
companies are driven by the requirements of 
different institutions, such as the need to 
comply with the environmental regulation, and 
not only the company’s aim to maximize 
profits (Jepperson, 1991). 
 
Leverage   Independent 
variable  
A continuous variable of the 
total debt divided by total assets 
at the end of the year.   
  
Companies with higher levels of debt 
are more likely to respond to the CDP 
questionnaire as these firms are more 
closely monitored (Stanny & Ely, 2008). 
Furthermore, leverage stimulates 
managers to provide carbon information 
voluntarily, particularly for managers of 
companies belonging to carbon 
Economic theories: Providing more 
information voluntarily about the environment, 
for example when a firm is more highly 
leveraged, improves management’s 
reputation because it is being more 
transparent. Furthermore this practice signals 
that management is taking responsibility for 
the environment (Hahn et al., 2015) 
 
17 For some of the variables included in this table there is an overlap with the three theories. However, the researcher has included the most relevant theory, 
although there is some overlap.  
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Variable 
name   
Control/ 
independent 
variable   
Variable description   Explanation for inclusion, per the 
literature   
Related theories17 
intensive industries  (Hahn et al., 2015; 
Jaggi et al., 2018).  
 
Return on 
assets (ROA)  
Control 
variable   
ROA is a proxy for a firm’s 
profitability. This continuous 
variable is calculated as the 
earnings before interest and tax 
(EBIT), divided by total assets 
as at the end of the year. 
   
It is necessary to include this variable as 
profitable firms can more readily afford 
the expenditures incurred to disclose 
information about climate change (Luo 
et al., 2012). 
Economic theories: Profitability is a predicator 
of carbon disclosure (Hahn et al., 2015). 
Furthermore, in line with economic theories, 
economic pressure is inversely associated 
with the decision to disclose to the CDP (Luo, 
Lan and Tang, 2012). 
Incentives Independent 
variable  
This variable is derived from a 
question in the CDP 
questionnaire. The CDP 
question reads “Do you provide 
incentives for the management 
of climate change issues, 
including the attainment of 
targets?” 
The responses are either yes or 
no (per a drop-down menu). 
Therefore, this is a binary 
variable. The response has 
been coded as 1 for yes and 0 
for no. 
 
If management is aware of the 
company’s impact on the environment, 
then it can take steps to mitigate climate 
change (Kolk & Pinkse, 2004; Wittneben 
& Kiyar, 2009) 
Therefore, if key management want to 
ensure that climate change is an 
important issue for the company then 
amounts paid to key management 
should be linked to improvements in 
environmental performance (Deegan & 
Islam, 2012). 
Institutional theories: If institutional investors 
call for integration of environmental metrics in 
managerial incentivisation schemes then 
revised reward structures are likely to be 
introduced by companies (Deegan & Islam, 
2012).  
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Variable 
name   
Control/ 
independent 
variable   
Variable description   Explanation for inclusion, per the 
literature   
Related theories17 
Key 
management  
Independent 
variable  
This variable is derived from a 
question in the CDP 
questionnaire. The question 
reads “Please provide the 
following information for the 
person who has signed off 
(approved) your CDP climate 
change response”  
 
The companies had to enter the 
job title of the person who was 
responsible for completing the 
CDP questionnaire. Various job 
titles were indicated. Where the 
CDP questionnaire was signed 
off by either the Environment/ 
Sustainability manager or the 
Group Head of Safety and 
Sustainable Development then a 
value of 1 is assigned. This 
shows that there is a designated 
person responsible for 
approving the questionnaire, 
which may indicate that the risks 
and opportunities associated 
with climate change in the 
organisation are designated to 
this person responsible for the 
signoff. All other job titles are 
coded as 0. This variable is 
therefore a binary variable.  
 
The degree of management’s support 
for environmental activities can be used 
as an indicator of the quality of the 
climate change mitigation plan (Jacques 
et al., 1997).   
  
If management have allocated a 
separate person to ensure that the risks 
and opportunities related to the 
environment and sustainability are being 
addressed and reported then this 
allocation indicates management’s 
support for environmental 
activities (Reynolds, 2018). This 
allocation occurs because the CEO is 
not necessarily an expert in managing 
climate change (Reynolds, 2018). The 
company is then potentially more likely 
to have quality climate change mitigation 
plans, in the company’s disclosure, if 
there is a separate person responsible 
for providing this (Deegan & Islam, 
2012).  
 
Institutional theories: The level of 
responsibility delegated to key management 
to manage emissions disclosures and climate 
change issues is considered to enhance 
shareholder value (Najah & Cotter, 2012). 
Therefore, disclosing information about key 
management in voluntary environmental 
disclosure to CDP, manages the public’s 
impression about the company’s activities 
(Cormier et al., 2005). This practice aligns to 
institutional theories.    
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Variable 
name   
Control/ 
independent 
variable   
Variable description   Explanation for inclusion, per the 
literature   
Related theories17 
Paris 
Agreement  
Independent 
variable  
Paris Agreement is an indicator 
variable where the indicator is 0 
for the years 2013 to 2015 and 1 
for the years 2016 and 2017. 
The Paris Agreement is 
therefore a binary variable.  
 
As demonstrated in Figure 2, under 
Descriptive Statistics, post the signing of 
the Paris Agreement, the CDP scores 
were higher which means better 
environmental stewardship i.e. 5=A. This 
implies an improvement in voluntary 
disclosure. Thus it is necessary to 
include this variable as companies post 
signing the Paris Agreement are more 
likely to produce disclosures to an 
organisation like the CDP (Kauffmann & 
Less, 2010). 
  
Institutional theories:  One of the driving 
factors for institutional theories disclosure is 
what companies have disclosed because of 
routine and regulation (Cormier et al., 2005). 
The Paris Agreement is an example of a 
regulation which might drive disclosure to 
CDP.  
Industry  Control 
variable   
The JSE has seven industries: 
basic materials, consumer 
goods, consumer services, 
financials, health care, industrial 
and telecommunications (JSE, 
2013).  
In order to incorporate this 
variable into the regression it is 
coded as 1 for industries that 
are considered to be a high 
carbon intensive industries 
(industrials and basic 
materials)), and 0 for the other 
industries. This approach is 
consistent with Guenther et al. 
(2016.)  This variable is 
therefore a binary variable.  
 
Companies in carbon intensive 
industries are subject to more regulation 
of their emissions and as such are 
subject to attention from 
investors (Guenther et al., 2016; Stanny 
& Ely, 2008).  
Economic theories: Affiliations with a carbon-
intensive industry is a predicator of carbon 
disclosure (Hahn et al., 2015).  
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Variable 
name   
Control/ 
independent 
variable   
Variable description   Explanation for inclusion, per the 
literature   
Related theories17 
Future risks  Independent 
variable  
This variable is derived from a 
question in the CDP 
questionnaire. The CDP 
question reads “please select 
the option that best describes 
your risk management 
procedures with regard to 
climate change risks and 
opportunities – how far into the 
future is climate risk 
considered?”  
 
The drop-down for the question 
allows the following options, 
which have been coded as a 
categorical variable 
accordingly: 1 to 3 years=1; 3 to 
6 years=2 ;> 6 years=3; 
Unknown/not provided=4.   
 
How far into the future climate change 
risk is considered indicates how the 
current business is likely to overcome 
climate change disruption (Wessel & 
Christensen, 2012). Furthermore, 
managers are more likely to disclose 
their future climate change risk 
management than their historical climate 
change risk management (Najah & 
Cotter, 2012).    
Socio-political theories: Managers use their 
future climate change risk management 
activities rather than their historical carbon 
emissions levels to manage stakeholders’ 
perceptions (Najah & Cotter, 2012). This 
procedure refers to how companies 
implement different strategies to manage their 
stakeholders in terms of stakeholder theory18 
(Roberts, 1992).  
 
 
18 Stakeholder theory is one of the socio-political theories as per the literature review.  
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Summary statistics for each of the variables in Table 1 are given in Tables 2 and 3 and 
Figures 3 and 4 to follow. First, Table 2 details the number of observations, the mean 
value, the standard deviation and the minimum and maximum values for each of the 
continuous variables. 
Table 2: Summary statistics for the continuous variables  
Variable name        
Continuous variables:  N Mean Std.Dev Min Max 
Size  242 10.25 31.74 0.06 302.16 
Foreign sales percentage (FSP) 242 37% 0.35% 0% 100% 
Leverage   242 0.54 0.21 0.00 0.95 
Return on assets (ROA)  242 9% 0.10% -26%  64% 
The four continuous variables i.e. FSP, Size, ROA, and Leverage, are all financial ratios. 
The largest company in the sample, with a MtoB ratio of 302, is British American Tobacco 
PLC. The average MtoB ratio for the sampled companies of 10. African Rainbow 
Minerals, with a MtoB ratio of 0.06, is the smallest company in the sample. There were 
some observed outliers for this variable above the 75th percentile. Outliers need to be 
considered for their effect on the testing and will be further assessed in the research 
approach. 
Of the sampled companies, the average proportion of total revenue that is earned from 
foreign sales is 37%. The maximum of 100% was obtained by six companies (Anglo 
American PLC, British American Tobacco PLC, Capital & County Properties PLC, 
Glencore Xstrata PLC, Hammerson PLC and Intu Properties PLC) who solely generate 
revenue outside of South Africa. No outliers were observed for this variable.  
For the Leverage variable, the calculated ratio of total debt divided by total assets cannot 
be greater than 1, in order for the accounting equation to balance (Prado-Lorenzo et al., 
2009). Accordingly, the maximum value of 0.95 for MMI Holdings Ltd shows that the 
company has a risky level of debt because it is more dependent on creditors than the 
other sampled companies (Guenther et al., 2016). Conversely, the minimum leverage 
value of 0 is for Old Mutual PLC who has no debt on its financial statements. No outliers 
were observed for this variable.  
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The average ROA, which indicates how profitable the company is, is 9%. The highest 
ROA percentage of 64% for Kumba Iron Ore Ltd in 2013 reflects the stronger market 
conditions in crude steel over that period (Kumba Iron Ore, 2013). The lowest ROA 
percentage is negative 26% for Telkom SA Ltd in 2013. ROA can have a negative value 
if a company is not profitable i.e. making losses. Telkom SA Ltd’s revenue decreased to 
R32.5 billion in 2013 as a result of sustained pressure on fixed-line operations, which 
include landlines and private pay phones (Telkom SA Ltd, 2013). The ROA variable had 
some observed outliers at 25th and 75th percentiles, which are discussed in the research 
approach.  
Table 3 details the number of observations, the frequency and the mean value (in 
parenthesis) for each of the binary variables. 
Table 3: Summary statistics for the binary variables  
Binary variables:  N Freq  
Incentives 242 190 (79%) 
Key management  242 82 (34%) 
Paris Agreement  242 103 (43%) 
Industry  242 97 (40%) 
The binary variables i.e. Incentives, Key Management, Paris Agreement and Industry, are 
interpreted differently to continuous variables. Being a binary variable, the frequency 
column shows that 79% of responses indicated that incentives are provided for the 
management of climate change issues. Thus, the majority of responding companies are 
providing incentives. A frequency of 34% for Key management which indicates that the 
majority (66%) of the sampled companies were not requiring either the 
Environment/Sustainability manager or the Group Head of Safety and Sustainable 
Development manager to approve the CDP questionnaire. A frequency of 43% for the 
Paris Agreement variable indicates that the majority (57%) of the sampled responses 
come from the period 2013 to 2015 i.e. pre-signing of the Paris Agreement. A frequency 
of 40% for Industry indicates that the majority (60%) of the sampled companies are not 
operating in carbon intensive industries. Further detail regarding this Industry variable is 
given in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3: Industry analysis of sampled companies by year 
Figure 3 indicates that the largest proportion of companies across all five years are in the 
basic materials industry, with the second largest proportion being in the financial industry. 
The telecommunications and health care industries make up the smallest proportion of 
the sampled companies. Included in Figure 3 is a dark black outline around the industrial 
and basic materials industries which are the carbon intensive industries (Guenther et al., 
2016). Over the five-year period, 37% to 42% of the sampled companies are in a carbon 
intensive industry.  
Finally, Figure 4 presents a pie chart of the categorical independent variable: Future 
Risks. 
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Figure 4: Future risk variable  
Figure 4 indicates that the largest proportion of companies indicated that they consider 
climate change risk more than 6 years into the future. This fact is promising as Ziervogel 
et al. (2014) was concerned that in South Africa the National Climate Change Response 
White Paper had not yet affected longer term planning.   
RESEARCH APPROACH 
It is appropriate to use a panel data regression to analyse the data in this study. Panel 
data refers to when there are repeated measurements on the same individual at different 
points in time (Cameron & Trivedi, 2009), which in this case is the sampled companies 
over the period 2013 to 2017. Panel data allows for the control of variables that change 
over time but that might not change across entities (Torres-reyna, 2007). A regression 
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can then be used to capture the variation in the units and the variation over time (Cameron 
& Trivedi, 2009).   
In a fixed-effect model the random individual-specific effects (𝑎𝑖) are permitted to be 
correlated with the independent variables (Cameron & Trivedi, 2009). While in the random 
effects model it is assumed that 𝑎𝑖 are purely random, implying that 𝑎𝑖 is uncorrelated 
with the independent variables (Cameron & Trivedi, 2009). To establish which model is 
more appropriate to use for the data a Hausman’s test is used. The null hypothesis of the 
Hausman’s test is that the individual-specific effects are random (Cameron & Trivedi, 
2009; Clark & Linzer, 2015). With a p value of 0.0757, this study fails to reject the null 
hypothesis at the 5% significance level. Therefore, it is appropriate to use the random 
effect panel data model for the data.  
A random effect panel data model assumes that unit effects are based on an underlying, 
modelled distribution (Clark & Linzer, 2015), which is appropriate given that the CDP 
scores and the independent variables vary over the sample period. More specifically, the 
random effect model will be used to examine the predictors of voluntary disclosure to 
CDP of carbon information, thereby testing the study’s hypothesis.   
A Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient was used to determine if there was any 
correlation between the dependent variable and each independent variable. In addition, 
correlations were inspected to determine if there was collinearity of independent variables 
against each other. A Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient is used to measure the 
strength and direction of the monotonic relationship between two continuous or ordinal 
variables (Lund Research Ltd, 2018). Correlations indicated that none of the variables 
exhibited collinearity with the other independent variables. Therefore, all the variables are 
incorporated into the regression. 
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To determine the best fit for the model, the data was inspected for outliers and run three 
times, namely: (1) using the data in its original format (n = 242), (2) using winsorised19 
data (n = 240), and (3) using the original data but excluding outliers (n = 229)20. The best 
model fit upon examination of the residuals plotted against the model fit was for the 
winsorised data. Further detail regarding this analysis is given in Appendix C. Therefore, 
all results presented in the remainder of this study are presented for the winsorised data.  
LIMITATIONS 
A limitation within this study is that the scope relates to the outcome of the CDP score 
which measures how well a company discloses information about climate change only. 
This study is not claiming to assess what drives good responses to climate change, only 
to assess climate change disclosures made to the CDP on climate change. This limitation 
does not hinder the relevance of this research because disclosure of climate change is 
indicative of companies acknowledging the importance of the climate change issue 
(Doran & Quinn, 2009) and companies detailing their risk exposure to climate change 
which has been lacking in practice (Doran & Quinn, 2009). The next chapter follows with 
the results presented for the random effects model for the winsorised data.
 
19 Winsorisation is a technique for handling outliers, where extreme values in a data set are transformed to 
a specified percentile of the data. For example, when there is winsorisation at the 90th percentile this would 
occur when all the data below the 5th percentile would be set at the 5th percentile and all data above the 
95th percentile would be set at the 95th percentile. Therefore, all the data now sits within the 90th percentile 
(Aguinis et al., 2013).  
20 Removing outliers is another technique for handling outliers which involves elimination of the outlying 
data points from the analysis (Aguinis et al., 2013).  
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RESULTS 
This chapter will begin by presenting the regression output for all sampled companies 
using winsorised data. As indicated in the Methodology chapter the results of the 
Hausman’s test revealed that the random effect panel data model is appropriate to use 
for the data. The formula for the random effect panel data model is presented below 
(Equation 1).  
𝐶𝐷𝑃 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 =  𝛽1𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑆𝑃 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑂𝐴 +  𝛽5𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠
+ 𝛽6𝐾𝑒𝑦 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑠 𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦
+  𝛽9−11𝐹𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑠 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 
      Equation 1 
In Equation 1 𝛽1−11 indicates the coefficient for each of the independent variables 
(Cameron & Trivedi, 2009), 𝑢𝑖𝑡 refers to the between-entity error term and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the within-
entity error (Torres-reyna, 2007). For all regression analyses performed, the reference 
Group for the Future Risk variable will be the time period of 1 to 3 years. As an example, 
the regression output will only present coefficients and standard errors for the remaining 
time frames i.e. 3 to 6 years, > 6 years, and unknown/not provided. All these coefficients 
are measured in relation to the timeframe of 1 to 3 years in determining their influence on 
the dependent variable. 
Standard diagnostics were performed on the variables for all testing performed. 
Examination of the Variance Inflation Factor(VIF)21 indicated no problems with 
multicollinearity22 across the independent variables, using a VIF of 10 as a rule of thumb 
 
21 Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) is widely used as a measure of multicollinearity across independent 
variables (O’Brien, 2007).  
22 The purpose of a regression is to estimate the parameters of dependency of a relationship (Donald & 
Glauber, 1967). Multicollinearity is where there is an interdependency condition (Donald & Glauber, 1967). 
Multicollinearity is thus a threat to the structural relationship sought in a regression (Donald & Glauber, 
1967).  
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(Meek et al., 1995; O’Brien, 2007). Plots of residuals23 and fit were also checked for each 
variable and indicated no serious mis-specification of the models (Meek et al., 1995).   
PREDICTORS OF CDP SCORE 
Table 4 presents the coefficient and the associated z-score for each of the independent 
variables using the random effects model specified in Equation 1.  
Table 4: Predictors of CDP Score for all companies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In table 4: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 for statistically significant variables. Standard errors are 
in parenthesis.  
 
23 The difference between the observed value and the predicted value is called the residual. Residuals are 
used to assess the adequacy of linear models (Cox & Snell, 1968). More specifically the graphs of 
residuals are examined for trends, symmetry of distributions, and changes of sign (Roger Newson et al., 
2006). Additionally the normality, linearity and homoscedasticity assumptions were determined based on 
the analysis of residuals (Amran & Haniffa, 2011). No serious mis-specifications were noted.  
 Coefficient z 
Size 0.01 
(0.01) 
0.78 
FSP 0.30 
(0.18) 
1.55 
Leverage 0.08 
(0.30) 
0.25 
ROA -1.17  
(0.62) 
-1.88 
Incentives 0.79 *** 
(0.15) 
5.39 
Key management 0.07 
(0.12) 
0.57 
Paris Agreement 0.51*** 
(0.09) 
5.66 
Industry 0.24 
(0.16) 
1.49 
Future risk: 3 to 6 
years 
0.52 *** 
(0.16) 
3.10 
Future risk: > 6 
years 
0.49 *** 
(0.16) 
3.03 
Future risk: not 
provided 
0.38** 
(0.18) 
2.52 
Constant 2.31 8.16 
R2 within 0.31  
N 240  
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The results from Table 4 show that the statistically significant variables related to the CDP 
score are Incentives, the Paris Agreement and Future risk. Discussion of each of these 
variables follows.   
Incentives are statistically significant and positively correlated with the CDP score at the 
1% significance level. Compared to companies in which no incentives are given the CDP 
score is expected to be 0.79 times higher for companies that do give incentives. This 
makes sense as Ihlen (2009) indicated that incentives can be effective in rewarding 
responsible corporations. Furthermore, being able to identify and understand managers’ 
incentives is considered by Luo et al. (2012) to be a driving force to create a low-carbon 
economy. This claim indicates that incentives play a role incentivising behaviour around 
climate change. Practically there are various types of incentives that can be provided. 
Therefore, it is considered worthwhile to further assess this variable by considering 
whether the type of incentives influences the CDP score, which will follow in the next sub-
section.  
In Table 4, the Paris Agreement variable is also statistically significant and positively 
correlated with the CDP score at the 1% significance level. This result aligns with the 
results seen in Figure 2 in the Method Chapter. Companies who completed the CDP 
questionnaire after the Paris Agreement are expected to have a CDP score, on average, 
0.51 times higher than companies who completed the CDP questionnaire before the Paris 
Agreement. This result shows better environmental stewardship for companies post the 
signing of the Paris Agreement which aligns with the literature reviewed. Wolfgang et al. 
(2016) suggests that the years following the Paris Agreement would indicate whether the 
global community is willing to seriously tackle the challenges of climate change. Based 
on these results it appears that South African companies are considering the seriousness 
of the climate change issue post the signing of the Paris Agreement.  
Future Risk has a statistically significant relationship with the CDP score. As a reminder, 
this variable assessed how long into the future management was considering climate 
change in its disclosure to the CDP, and the coefficients are assessed in relation to the 
reference Group i.e. where climate change risk is considered 1 to 3 years into the future. 
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Table 4 shows that companies with a 3 to 6 years future risk assessment or greater than 
6 years future risk assessment are, on average, expected to have a CDP score of 0.52 
and 0.49 more when compared to companies with a 1 to 3 years future risk assessment, 
holding all other variables in the model constant. This result suggests better 
environmental stewardship for companies with a longer-term view for their risk 
assessment. These findings are supported by Yow and Rubin (2017) who indicate that 
companies must adopt a longer term view for issues of sustainability, such as climate 
change, that are material to their business. Therefore, companies should consider the 
future risk of climate change with a longer-term view to determine how tangible their risk 
is.  
None of the remaining variables in Table 4 show a statistically significant relationship with 
the CDP score. In particular, this result is contrary to the findings from the literature where 
the size of the company was positively correlated and statistically significant (Prado-
Lorenzo et al., 2009), the FSP variable was correlated with whether firms disclose 
information requested by the CDP (Stanny & Ely, 2008), the Leverage variable was 
positively correlated with voluntary disclosure to the CDP (Elfeky, 2017; Jaggi et al., 2017) 
and being in a carbon-intensive industry was not positively associated with voluntary 
disclosure to the CDP (Stanny & Ely, 2008). However Jaggi et al. ( 2017) similarly found 
that the ROA did not have a positive relationship with the CDP score .  
The study conducted by Prado-Lorenzo et al. (2009), which had a differing MtoB variable 
finding, was completed in 2009 using data from the Fortune 500 companies and includes 
data from countries that had both ratified and not ratified the Kyoto Protocol. It is 
hypothesised that the result of this current study differed to the study conducted by Prado-
Lorenzo et al. (2009) because the sample was from a single country (South Africa) which 
had ratified both the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement.  
Stanny & Ely (2008) conducted a study in the United States (US) which had the differing 
FSP variable finding. FSP is a measure of the total foreign sales, divided by total turnover 
of a company for the year. Not all the South African companies in this current study’s 
sample had any foreign sales i.e. an FSP of 0 (n=19). Stanny & Ely (2008) possibly had 
differing results since their sample had more of the companies with foreign sales. The 
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Industry variable finding compared to the study conducted by Stanny & Ely (2008) was 
also different. In this current study’s sample, most of the companies were in the financial 
services industry (n=40). The US has many more listed companies than South Africa and 
could perhaps have had more diverse industry representation in the sample that resulted 
in the different findings between the studies.  
There were two papers with differing leverage results. The study conducted by Elfeky 
(2017) was based  solely on Egyptian companies and the study conducted by Jaggi et al. 
(2017) was based on solely Italian companies. The percentage of debt to gross national 
product (GDP) for Egypt is almost double that of South Africa, and in Italy it is almost 
triple that of South Africa (Country Economy, 2018; Grey, 2017). It is suggested that 
perhaps the differing levels of debt between these countries resulted in the differing 
findings.  
The final variable that did not have a statistically significant relationship with the CDP 
score is the key management variable. The key management variable was not 
incorporated into prior studies of the CDP score. It is therefore not possible to conclude 
on whether allocating a separate person to manage the risks and opportunities related to 
the environment and sustainability will result in an improved CDP score. Jacques et al. 
(1997) however stated that the degree of management’s support for environmental 
activities can be used as an indicator of the quality of the climate change mitigation plan. 
Jacques et al. (1997) might have therefore coded the variable as 1 if there was CEO 
involvement and 0 for designated officer. This is a potential area for future research.  
Next, the Incentives variable will be further assessed. Incentives provided have important 
implications for managerial behaviour (Deegan & Islam, 2012), thus understanding the 
role of incentives in motivating managers to focus on sustainability is topical (Deegan & 
Islam, 2012). Furthermore, given the statistical and economic significance of incentives 
on the CDP score in this study, it was considered necessary to further assess the 
relationship between the CDP score and the Incentives variable.  
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INCENTIVES 
In Table 4, the Incentives variable was treated as a binary variable and indicated whether 
incentives were or were not given for the management of climate change issues. As part 
of the data collection phase the type of incentive recorded for each companies’ climate 
change questionnaire to the CPD was so collected. Therefore for this additional test, the 
Incentive variable is recoded as follows: where no incentive is provided the variable has 
a value of 0 (n=52), where management’s incentive is monetary the variable has a value 
of 1 (n=128), and where management’s incentive is based on both a monetary reward 
and recognition, the Incentives variable has a value of 2 (n= 62). Thus, the variable is no 
longer a binary variable but a categorical variable. The formula for the random effect panel 
data model is shown in Equation 2.  
𝐶𝐷𝑃 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 =  𝛽1𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑆𝑃 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑂𝐴 +  𝛽5−6𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠
+ 𝛽7𝐾𝑒𝑦 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑠 𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦
+  𝛽10−12𝐹𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑠 +   𝑢𝑖𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 
      Equation 2 
In Equation 2 𝛽1−12 indicates the coefficient for each of the independent variables 
(Cameron & Trivedi, 2009), 𝑢𝑖𝑡 refers to the between-entity error term and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the within-
entity error (Torres-reyna, 2007). Providing no incentive is the reference Group for the 
incentive variable24. The output for this test is presented in Table 5.  
 
24 No incentives provided is selected as the reference Group. As an example, the regression output will 
only present coefficients and standard errors for the remaining options i.e. where a monetary reward is 
given as an incentive (𝛽5 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠 ) or where both a monetary reward and recognition are  used as an 
incentive (𝛽6 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠).  
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Table 5: Predictors of CDP Score for all companies (Categorical Incentive 
variable) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
In table 5: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 for statistically significant variables. Standard errors are 
in parenthesis.  
Table 5 shows that both monetary incentives and monetary and recognition incentives 
are positively statistically significant at the 1% significance level. This could be because 
both include monetary incentives. None of the companies in this sample had only 
recognition incentives. Companies providing either type of incentive, providing monetary 
incentives alone or both monetary incentive and recognition, are expected to have, on 
average, a CDP score of 0.79 or 0.80 more when compared to companies that do not 
provide incentives, holding all other variables in the model constant. These findings 
enhance those seen in Table 4. Given no notable difference in either the economic or 
statistical significance of the two types of incentives, the results suggest that it is not the 
 Coefficients   z 
Size  0.01 
(0.02) 
0.79 
FSP  0.30 
(0.19) 
1.55 
Leverage  0.07 
(0.32) 
0.23 
ROA  -1.15 
(0.62) 
-1.84 
Incentive: Monetary  0.79*** 
(0.15) 
5.25 
Incentive: Monetary & 
Recognition  
0.80 *** 
(0.16) 
5.04 
Key management  0.07 
(0.12) 
0.57 
Paris Agreement 0.51*** 
(0.09) 
5.61 
Industry  0.24 
(0.16) 
1.50 
Future risk: 3 to 6 years 0.52 *** 
(0.17) 
3.08 
Future risk: > 6 years 0.50 *** 
(0.16) 
3.06 
Future risk: not 
provided 
0.38** 
(0.15) 
2.51 
Constant  2.31 8.19 
R2 0.30  
N  240  
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type of incentive given that assists in driving better environmental stewardship, but rather 
the practice of providing incentives in the first instance.    
The results of this study suggest, as indicated by Hartman, Perego and Young (2013), 
monetary incentives make management more eager to promote environmental risk-
reducing activities. Furthermore, non-monetary incentives such as recognition are most 
cost-effective and workers exert more effort when the meaning of work is higher (Kosfeld, 
Neckermann & Yang, 2014). Therefore, companies should consider the structure of 
incentives for managing climate change issues, as the practice of providing incentives is 
important. However, contrary to the results of this study, it should be noted that the 
literature which indicates that monetary incentives are the primary means of motivating 
employees and drive their performance and behaviour (Kosfeld et al., 2014).  
There is no difference in the statistical significance or direction of the remaining 
coefficients in Table 5, when compared to the results in Table 4, therefore, the results of 
Table 5 merely provide further insight into the Incentive variable. 
The purpose of this study was to determine which factors, either company specific or 
individual company responses within the CDP questionnaire, are associated with the CDP 
climate change score. The results of Table 4 and 5 indicated that Incentives, the Paris 
Agreement and Future Risk factors are associated with the CDP climate change score, 
thereby answering the research question put forward. 
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CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
The purpose of this study was to determine which factors, either company specific or 
individual company responses within the CDP questionnaire, influence a high CDP 
climate change score for South African companies. A random effect panel data model 
regression was run using winsorised data and provided results showing that Incentives, 
the Paris Agreement and Future Risk were all statistically significant in influencing the 
CDP score. 
To start, the finding that the Paris Agreement variable is positively statistically significant 
suggests that South African companies are considering the seriousness of addressing 
the climate change issue post the signing of the Paris Agreement. The results align with 
the literature which questioned whether an analysis of the years following the Paris 
Agreement would show whether the global community is willing to tackle the challenges 
of climate change (Wolfgang et al., 2016).  
The Future Risk variable which was positively statistically significant indicates that there 
is likely to be better environmental stewardship the longer into the future that 
management consider climate change. These findings are supported by Yow and Rubin 
(2017) who indicated that companies must adopt a longer term view for climate change 
issues that materially affect their business.  
Lastly, where companies provide incentives for the management of climate change issues 
these companies are more likely to have a higher CDP score. This result is consistent 
irrespective of the type of incentive given. Therefore, companies should consider the 
structure of incentives for managing climate change issues. Hartman et al. (2013) 
indicated that monetary incentives make management more eager to promote 
environmental risk-reducing activities. While non-monetary incentives such as recognition 
are most cost-effective and workers exert more effort when the meaning of work is higher 
(Kosfeld, Neckermann & Yang, 2014). Figure 5 indicates how each of the variables from 
this study link to disclosure theories and which variables were statistically significant. 
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Figure 5: Disclosure theories and variables   25
 
25 For some of the variables included in this figure there is an overlap with the three theories. However, the researcher has included the most relevant theory, 
although there is some overlap. 
Disclosure theories & 
variables
Institutional 
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FSP variable
Key 
Management 
variable
Incentives 
variable
*Positively 
statistically 
significant 
Paris 
Agreement 
variable
*Positively 
statistically 
significant
Economic 
theories
Leverage 
variable
ROA variable
Industry 
variable
Socio-political 
theories
Size variable 
Future Risk 
variable
*Positively 
statistically 
significant
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This study’s findings add to the literature on disclosure theories. If institutional investors, 
in terms of Institutional theories, call for incentives to motivate for climate change 
management, companies are more likely to introduce these incentive schemes and make 
the appropriate disclosures, particularly to the CDP (Deegan & Islam, 2012). This finding 
indicates that institutional investors should request that incentives be implemented 
because this will result in the company obtaining a higher CDP score. Furthermore, in 
terms of Institutional theories, if regulations stipulated in the Paris Agreement are 
implemented, this process might be a driving force for corporate climate change 
disclosure (Cormier et al., 2005). Consequently, institutional investors may want to 
motivate for this disclosure post the signing of the Paris Agreement to become mandatory 
to an organisation such as the CDP.   
In terms of Socio-political theories, managers are far more willing to disclose their future 
climate change risk activities than their carbon emissions levels to manage stakeholders’ 
perceptions of the company (Najah & Cotter, 2012). This study’s findings indicate that 
managers should be made aware that the further into the future they consider climate 
change risk management the better because this action will result in the company 
obtaining an improved CDP score, whilst simultaneously managing stakeholders’ 
perceptions of the company.  
Recommendations based on these results are appropriate for companies and policy 
makers of the JSE Top 100 companies. Many of the companies were excluded due to 
incomplete information or non- respondence to the CDP. The first recommendation is that 
all companies, particularly South African companies in the JSE Top 100, consider 
responding to the CDP. Secondly for those companies responding to the CDP if a 
company wants to improve its CDP score it should ensure that it is incentivising its staff 
to manage climate change.  
The South African DEA (2017) stated that it will evaluate the private sector’s transition to 
a lower carbon economy based on companies’ participation and activities disclosed in 
their responses to the CDP. Thus, policymakers in South Africa could draw attention to 
the findings that a company’s CDP score improves if future risk is considered further into 
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the future and encourage companies to align their goals with the Paris Agreement’s 
objectives. Furthermore, this process could assist the policymakers in trying to get their 
policies implemented sooner.  
AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH  
This research project analysed 242 responses due to its focus only on South African 
companies that responded to the CDP. Future research could repeat this study and 
increase the sample size by including responses from different countries that have ratified 
the Paris Agreement in order to present a global study. This enlarged scope will help 
researchers in part to understand the differences that exist between countries such as 
that seen with the Leverage variable in Egypt and Italy and determine if the findings of 
this study are consistent with the global norm.   
This study’s scope was related to the outcome of the CDP score which measures only 
how well a company discloses information about climate change. This study does not 
claim to assess what drives good responses to climate change, to assess disclosures 
made to the CDP on climate change. Future research could be conducted to assess what 
drives good responses to climate change, focussing on the management of climate 
change and not just the disclosure of climate change management. Climate change 
management could be considered the final product, while the disclosure output is the 
interim product.  
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APPENDIX A  
 
 
Key for Table 6 
✓ Included in sample 
x Excluded from sample 
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Table 6: South African companies’ responses to the CDP questionnaire 
Rank 
  Full Name  
Industry 
CDP 
2017  
CDP 
2016  
CDP 
2015 
CDP 
2014 
CDP 
2013 
1 ABINBEV Anheuser-Busch Inbev SA NV Consumer goods x x x x x 
2 BATS British am. Tobacco PLC Consumer goods ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
3 NASPERSN Naspers Ltd Consumer services x x  x x x 
4 GLENCORE Glencore Xstrata PLC Basic materials ✓ ✓ ✓ x x 
5 RICHEMONT Compagnie Fin Richemont Consumer goods  x x x x  x  
6 BILLITON Bhp Billiton PLC Basic materials ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
7 FIRSTRAND Firstrand Ltd Financials x x x x x 
8 ANGLO Anglo American PLC Basic materials ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
9 STANBANK Standard Bank Group Ltd Financials x x x x x 
10 VODACOM Vodacom Group Ltd Telecommunications ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
11 SASOL Sasol Ltd Basic materials ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
12 MTN MTN Group Ltd Telecommunications ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
13 OLDMUTUAL Old Mutual PLC Financials ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
14 SANLAM Sanlam Ltd Financials x x ✓ ✓ ✓ 
15 B-AFRICA Barclays Africa Group Ltd Financials x x x x x 
16 SOUTH32 South32 Ltd Basic materials ✓ ✓ x x x 
17 SHOPRIT Shoprite Holdings Ltd Consumer services x  x  x  x  x 
18 NEDCOR Nedbank Group Ltd Financials x x x x x 
19 REMGRO Remgro Ltd Industrial ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
20 RMBH RMB Holdings Ltd Industrial x x x x x 
21 ASPEN Aspen Pharmacare Holdings Health care ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
22 DISCOVERY Discovery Holdings Ltd Financials ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
23 KUMBAIO Kumba Iron Ore Ltd Basic materials ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
24 MONDIPLCP Mondi PLC  Basic materials ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
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25 ANGLOPLAT 
Anglo American Platinum Corporation 
Ltd Basic materials 
✓ ✓ ✓ x  ✓ 
26 CAPITEC Capitec Financials x x x x x 
27 BIDCORP Bid Corporation Ltd Consumer services x x x x x 
28 GROWPNT Growthpoint Properties Ltd Financials x x x x x 
29 TIGBRANDS Tiger Brands Ltd Consumer goods ✓ ✓ ✓ x ✓ 
30 BIDVEST The Bidvest Group Ltd Industrials  x x ✓ ✓ ✓ 
31 MRPRICE Mr Price Group Ltd Consumer services x x x x x 
32 SHRETAIL Steinhoff African rt Ltd Consumer services x x x x x 
33 MEDCLIN Mediclinic Int PLC Health care x  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
34 NEPIROCK Nepi Rockcastle PLC Financials x x x x x 
35 WOOLIES Woolworths Holdings Ltd Consumer services ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
36 INVPLC Investec PLC Financials x x x x x 
37 RMIH Rand Merch Ins Holdings Ltd Financials x x x x x 
38 REDEFINE Redefine Properties Ltd Financials ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
39 HAMMERSON Hammerson PLC Financials ✓ ✓ ✓ x  ✓ 
40 EXXARO Exxaro Resources Ltd Basic materials x x x x x 
41 TFG The Foschini Group Ltd Consumer services ✓ ✓ x x x 
42 IMPERIAL Imperial Holdings Ltd Industrials  ✓ ✓ ✓ x  x 
43 PSG PSG Group Ltd Financials x x x x x 
44 ASSORE Assore Ltd Basic materials x x x x x 
45 INTUPROP Intuprop Financials ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
46 TRUWTHS Truworths International Ltd Consumer services ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
47 ANGGOLD Anglogold Ashanti Ltd Basic materials ✓ ✓ ✓ x  ✓ 
48 REINET Reinet investments SCA Financials x x x x x 
49 CLICKS Clicks Group Ltd Consumer services ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
50 SAPPI Sappi Ltd Basic materials ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
51 A-V-I AVI Ltd Consumer goods x x x x x 
52 SPAR The Spar Group Ltd Consumer services ✓ ✓ ✓ x ✓ 
53 LIFEHC Life Healthcare Group Holdings Ltd Health care ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
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54 LIB-HOLD Liberty Holdings Ltd  Financials ✓ ✓ ✓ x ✓ 
55 BARWORLD Barloworld Ltd Industrial ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
56 NETCARE Netcare Ltd Health care ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
57 GFIELDS Gold fields Ltd Basic materials ✓ ✓ ✓ x  ✓ 
58 CAPCO Capital & Counties Prop PLC Financials ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ x 
59 MONDILTDP Mondi Ltd Basic materials x x x x x 
60 MASSMART Massmart Holdings Ltd Consumer services ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
61 PICKNPAY Pick ‘n Pay Stores Ltd Consumer services ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
62 MMIHOLDINGS MMI Holdings Ltd Financials ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
63 SANTAM Santam Ltd Financials x ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
64 INVLTD Investec Ltd Financials x x x x x 
65 PNR-FOODS Pioneer Foods Group Ltd Consumer goods x x ✓ ✓ x 
66 DISTELL Distell Consumer goods ✓ ✓ ✓ x x 
67 RESILIENT Resilient Property Income Fund Financials x x x x x 
68 Dis-Chem Dis-chem Pharmacies Ltd Consumer services x x x x x 
69 TSOGO-SUN Tsogo Sun Holdings Ltd Consumer services x x x x x 
70 CML Coronation Fund Managers Ltd Financials x x  x  x  x  
71 TELKOM Telkom SA Ltd Telecommunications ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
72 ARM African Rainbow Minerals Basic materials ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
73 HYPROP Hyprop Investments Ltd Financials ✓ ✓ ✓ x x 
74 STEINHOFF Steinhoff Int Holdings N.V. Consumer goods x ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
75 SIBANYE Sibanye Gold Ltd Basic materials ✓ ✓ ✓ x x 
76 KAP KAP industrial Holdings Industrials  x x ✓ x ✓ 
77 BRAIT Brait SE Financials x x x x x 
78 IMPLATS Impala Platinum Holdings Ltd Basic materials ✓ ✓ ✓ x ✓ 
79 NORTHAM Northam Platinum Ltd Basic materials ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
80 ITLTILE Italtile Ltd Consumer services x x x x x 
81 FORTRESSA Fortress income fund Ltd Financials x x x x x 
82 JSE JSE Ltd Financials ✓ ✓ ✓ x x 
83 FORTRESSB Fortress Reit Ltd Financials x x  x  x x 
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84 VUKILE Vukile Property Fund Ltd Financials x x  x x x 
85 GLOBETRD Globe Trade Centre SA. Financials x x x x x 
86 RCL RCL foods Ltd Consumer goods ✓ ✓ ✓ x x 
87 NEWGOLD New Gold Issuer Ltd Financials x x x x x 
88 MAS Mas Rei Financials x x x x x 
89 CURRO Curro Holdings Ltd Consumer services x  x x x x 
90 TONGAAT Tongaat Hulett Ltd Consumer goods ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
91 SUPRGROUP Super Group Ltd Industrials  x x x x x 
92 HCI Hosken Consolidated Investments Ltd Financials ✓ ✓ ✓ x ✓ 
93 REUNERT Reunert Ltd Industrials  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
94 ATT Attacq Ltd Financials x x x x x 
95 ACUCAP Acucap Properties Ltd Financials x x x x x 
96 AECI AECI Ltd Basic materials ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
97 GROUP Greenbay Properties Ltd  Financials x x x x x 
98 PPC PPC Ltd  Industrials  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
99 IPF Investec Property Fund  Financials x x x x x 
100 EPP Echo Polska Prop NV  Financials x x x x x 
         
  Companies incl. 242 50 53 55 38 46 
  Companies excl. 258 50 47 45 62 54 
    500 100 100 100 100 100 
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APPENDIX B 
Figure 6: Histogram of the CDP Score 2013 to 2015 
 
Figure 7: Histogram of the CDP Score 2016 to 2017 
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APPENDIX C  
The data was inspected for outliers, which were noted for two of the continuous 
variables, namely Size and ROA. Because of these outliers, it is necessary to consider 
whether the testing of the data should be performed excluding these outliers, using 
winsorised data, or if it is appropriate to keep the outliers in the original dataset 
(Aguinis, Gottfredson & Joo, 2013).  
Firstly, outliers were determined not to be error outliers (Aguinis et al., 2013). 
Secondly, outliers were checked to determine if the model fit would change after being 
removed (Aguinis et al., 2013). Therefore, to determine the best fit for the model, each 
of the tests were run three times, namely: (1) using the data in its original format (n = 
242), (2) using winsorised data (n = 240), and (3) using the original data but excluding 
outliers (n = 229). The best model fit upon examination of the residuals plotted against 
the model fit was for the winsorised data. Table 7 below indicates the winsorised 
variables, with only changes to the Size, Leverage and ROA variables.  
Table 7: Summary statistics for the continuous and binary independent 
variables after winsorising. 
Variable name         
Continuous variables:  N Mean Std.Dev Min Max Changed? 
Size  240 17.48 1.36 15.23 22.64  
Foreign 
sales percentage (FSP) 
242 37% 0.35 0% 100%  
Leverage   240 0.54 0.21 0.14 0.94  
Return on assets (ROA)  242 8% 0.09 -17&  35%  
       
Binary variables:  N Freq (%)     
Incentives 242 190 (79)     
Key management  242 82 (34)     
Industry  242 97 (40)     
Paris Agreement  242 103 (43)     
 
 
 
 
